











Steven M. Sylvester  
 
 
Submitted to the graduate degree program in Political Science at the University of Kansas and 
the Graduate Faculty of the University of Kansas in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the 






























The Dissertation Committee for Steven M. Sylvester 












































Understanding how public opinion towards health issues shape policy preferences and 
confidence in government requires not only understanding why such events engage public 
sentiments but also why they should matter to lawmakers and health policy experts. In an effort 
to understand the role of public opinion and emotion in towards health issues I explore three 
salient issues in health policy. First, using the policy diffusion framework, I explore how public 
opinion influenced state adoption of provisions of the ACA. Second, I explore how the threat of 
an outbreak of measles occurring in a community influences attitudes toward mandatory 
vaccination policies. Finally, I examine how individual anxiety towards Ebola influences 
confidence in government and policy preferences towards restrictive policies involving Ebola. 
My findings suggest that public opinion towards health policy issues not only influence state 
adoption of policy, but also influences individual policy preferences and evaluations of 
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Public Opinion, Public Policy and its Influence on Health Policy Issues 
Introduction 
When public health concerns receive considerable attention from politicians and media 
outlets, public anxiety about health issues is likely. Such fears and anxiety have been apparent 
recently with the measles outbreak connected to Disneyland in California and related calls for 
mandatory vaccinations of all children, and the Ebola outbreak in the Western African countries 
of Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Liberia, which increased the public’s concern about a widespread 
epidemic affecting the United States (Pew Research Centers 2014). In addition, the public 
continues to be divided over the Patient Protection Affordable Care Act (ACA), with 
Republicans calling for its full repeal and Democrats pushing for states to expand coverage under 
the law. Each of these events, whether they involve an epidemic of disease, an outbreak of the 
measles, or health reform, all play an important role in how individual attitudes and public 
opinion shape health policy issues.  
 Although researchers have examined public attitudes towards various health policy 
issues (see Frewer 2003; Gollust and Lynch 2011; Jacobs and Mettler 2011; Joffe 2011) less is 
known about how public attitudes on health policy issues influence policymaking or how 
confidence in government is shaped by attitudes about disease and other health issues. Public 
attitudes toward health issues can be shaped by anxiety or misunderstanding over a disease, its 
causes, and its potential consequences for society.  
Anxiety can not only increase intolerance towards certain groups but can also influence 
individual preferences towards policy (Huddy et al. 2005). The recent outbreak of measles in 
California shows how anxiety can influence public attitudes towards certain groups. A recent 
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CNN poll found that 78 percent of individuals believed parents should be required to vaccinate 
their children against preventable diseases; 58 percent of individuals believe that children who 
are not vaccinated should not be allowed to participate in public schools or day care activities 
(LaMotte 2015). Similarly, when the public was made aware that a citizen from Liberia (a 
country not impacted by the Ebola outbreak) traveled to Texas infected with Ebola, an 
ABC/Washington Post poll in 2014 found that 73 percent of the public supported restricting 
entry into the United States from individuals coming from areas impacted by Ebola.    
The central tenant in most democracies is that the government should be responsive to the 
preferences of the citizens. However, should policymakers be responsive to public opinion even 
when public demands are not based in evidence? How do policymakers balance the rights of 
parents to decide health care options for their children versus potential outbreaks of diseases that 
have long been eradicated within the United States? Should policymakers ban travel to and from 
countries that have been impacted by an outbreak of disease because of public concerns about a 
potential outbreak occurring in the United States? Should states be responsive to desires of their 
citizens when it comes to expansion of Medicaid? This dissertation explores potential answers to 
these questions and more broadly examines the interplay between public opinion and public 
health issues.  
Public Opinion and Policy 
 To say that views about the impact of public opinion on policy vary widely would be an 
understatement (Burstein 2014). For example, Stimson et al. (1995) found a relationship between 
the preferences of the public and policy outcomes at the national level existed. Similar results 
have also been found at the state level (Erikson et al. 1993; Lax and Phillips 2009, 2012). On the 
other side of the debate are the many scholars who consider the idea that public opinion 
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influences policy absurd and dismiss findings that support the opinion influencing policy (Manza 
and Brooks 2012). Theda Skocpol, for instance, argues that public opinion had little to do with 
the way the American welfare system was structured. Instead, she finds that structural factors of 
the government, mainly the multiple veto points, help explain why the American welfare system 
is very different from those in European countries (Skocpol 1995). 
 The belief that politicians are responsive to public opinion ultimately rests on the 
assumption that political elites derive benefit from pursuing policies that are (or appear to be) in 
line with the wishes of citizens (Downs 1957; Jacobs and Shapiro 2000; Manza and Cook 2002). 
For example, Mayhew (1974) argued that the primary motivation for legislators to be responsive 
to constituents is the desire to be reelected. However, accepting that legislators are responsive to 
constituents assumes that legislators know the desires of their citizens. Scholars have suggested 
for years that the policy preferences of most citizens are either nonattitudes and are incapable of 
coherently informing policy or they are so weakly held they are able to be manipulated by 
political elites (Converse 1964). Some studies have tried to paint a more improved capacity of 
the public (Nie et al. 1979), but most research has continued to find little evidence that voters are 
informed (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996).  
 If information is low, can citizens meaningfully express opinions in ways legislators are 
able to react to? Recent work in political psychology has provided answers to this question. For 
example, Zaller and Feldman (1992) contend that individuals have a large number of 
“considerations” stored in memory and the saliency of an issue or priming can help the 
individual recall certain opinions that are top of mind. Other work has suggested public opinion 
moves over time in ways that are seen by political elites as the will of the voters (Erikson et al. 
2002; Page and Shapiro 1992). Still, politicians are frequently not able to draw on survey-based 
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information about public attitudes because poll data does not exist on most of the questions that 
come before policymakers (Burstein 2006; Burstein 2014; Nicholson-Crotty 2009). Many of the 
problems listed above have plagued health reform efforts in the United States. 
Public Opinion and Health Policy  
 Most people know little or nothing about most policies – and cannot be expected to. 
Major pieces of legislation are often complicated and impossible to understand in detail; for 
example, the ACA alone was 906 pages. Although most citizens approved of major provisions of 
the law (i.e. preexisting conditions, children staying on their parents’ insurance until 26, and the 
removal of insurance caps), the public was divided on the law as a whole (Jacobs and Metter 
2011). A recent Kaiser Health Tracking Poll in April of 2016 found that 49 percent of adults had 
an unfavorable opinion of the ACA while only 38 percent of adults had a favorable opinion of 
the ACA (Kaiser Family Foundation 2016).   
 Where people say they obtained their information on the law helps to clarify the divided 
opinion towards the law. Prior to the passage of the ACA, 68 percent of respondents said they 
were getting their information from family and friends. 63 percent also mentioned cable, and 55 
percent mentioned broadcast news programs. The survey found that of those who watched Fox 
News 78 percent were opposed to the law, while 52 percent of those who watched CNN favored 
the law (Kaiser Family Foundation 2010). Even with divisions over the ACA evident, the ACA 
still passed in 2010. What allowed this attempt of health care reform to pass when so many 
health reforms since the 1930s had failed?  
One reason is that it was just the right time. Jacobs and Skocpol (2012) argue major 
reforms such as Social Security, Medicare or Medicaid are enacted only when the stars align just 
right. In many ways though, the environment in 2008 was eerily similar to the lead-up of the 
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1992 election with the country facing an economic downturn and engaged in a war in the Middle 
East taking attention away from domestic matters (Jacobs 2008). However, the major difference 
present in 2008, which was not possible in 1992, were the convincing majorities Democrats had 
in both the House and Senate which aligned with a Democratic president in the White House 
(Jacobs and Skocpol 2012). Still though, the implementation of the ACA rested upon the states 
and its acceptance of expanding Medicaid to individuals at or below 138 of the Federal Poverty 
Line and objections to the ACA were almost instant. In fact, the very day President Obama 
signed the ACA into law, twelve states had already joined a lawsuit with the State of Virginia 
challenging the constitutionality of the ACA (Joondeph 2011).     
The success of the ACA rested upon a two-prong state adoption process. The first was 
through the creation of a health exchange system in which individuals could compare insurance 
plans and select a plan suitable to their needs. The second was through the expansion of 
Medicaid to all citizens under the age of sixty-five earning up to 138% of the federal poverty 
level. To help states deal with the increased costs associated with the expansion of Medicaid, the 
federal government agreed to subsidize 100% of the costs of adding new enrollees from 2016, 
after which the share would gradually decline until 2022 when the government will cover 90% of 
the costs (Young 2012).  
The expansion of Medicaid was the primary tool the federal government employed to 
tackle the health care access problem in the United States (Jacobs and Callaghan 2013). 
However, the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in NIFB v. Sebelius in 2012 essentially stripped the 
mechanism in which the government used to entice to Medicaid expansion; as such, states were 
able to make decisions on the expansion of Medicaid absent of fiscal coercion. What led states to 
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adopt provisions of the ACA and did public opinion towards the ACA play any role in that 
decision process? This question is more fully explored in Chapter 2.  
Beyond the ACA, public opinion plays an important role in others areas of health policy. 
Recently, significant research has examined the role emotions play towards health policy and 
other issues like terrorism (Albertson and Gadarian 2015; Davis and Silver 2004; Huddy et al. 
2002, 2005). Emotions are “multi-faceted, whole-body phenomena” (Gross and Thompson 2009, 
5) that occur when individuals evaluate a situation which changes perceptions and behaviors 
(Albertson and Gadarian 2015; Clore and Isbell 2001).  
In Chapter 4, I examine how emotions, mainly anxiety, influence confidence in 
government. Anxiety occurs when an individual evaluates a situation as being unpleasant, highly 
threatening, and uncertain (Lerner and Keltner 2000, 2001). Anxiety can manifest itself in two 
ways. First, anxiety can occur because of concern for oneself or one’s family. Secondly, anxiety 
can develop out of a concern about a potential threat towards society, the country as a whole, or 
the region where one lives, often referred to as sociotropic threat. To understand how anxiety 
influences political attitudes, I examine how anxiety towards Ebola influences confidence in 
government and support for more restrictive policies for people entering the United States from 
areas affected by Ebola in Chapter 4.  
Finally, I examine how the perception of threat, like an outbreak of measles, influences 
support for mandatory vaccination policies. Threat perception occurs when an individual 
determines a distressing event will likely occur. This perception, whether it is real or perceived 
influences policy preferences and intolerance towards the groups responsible for the perceived 
threat (Huddy et al. 2005).  
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Although threat perception has not been widely utilized in health policy research, the 
impact of threat and its influence on policy has been documented within counterterrorism 
literature. For example, Davis and Silver (2004) found that individuals who were more 
concerned about a future terrorist attack were more likely to support counterterrorism policies 
that limit civil liberties but provide for additional securities. Similarly, Huddy et al. (2005) find 
that individuals who perceive an imminent terrorist attack in the United States were more likely 
to support antiterrorism policies that restricted civil liberties. Individual perceptions of threat 
lead citizens to support policies that they believe will neutralize the source of the threat and 
protect them (Gadarian 2010; Gordon and Arian 2001). Chapter 3 of the dissertation is an 
attempts to examine how threat perception influences support for mandatory vaccination 
policies.   
 Three separate empirical projects examining the influence of opinion on health policy 
issues makeup the body of the dissertation. They are each briefly outlined below. The fifth and 
final chapter of the dissertation summarizes the findings of these projects and discusses their 
collective implications and relevance to policymakers and scholars of public policy.  
Overview of the Dissertation 
Chapter 2 
Chapter 2 examines the influence of public opinion on state adoption of provisions of the 
ACA. Even with the passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) in 2010, 
health care continues to be a prominent point of conflict between national and state policy 
agendas. Public attitudes towards the ACA have been divided, even though many support the 




Although 32 states have decided to expand Medicaid and 17 states have created a state-
run health insurance marketplace, this chapter seeks to understand if state adoption of provisions 
of the ACA is driven by public opinion or some other force (external or internal) to the state. 
Using a policy diffusion framework, my findings indicate that citizen preferences on the ACA 
have influenced the likelihood of policy adoption, but state adoption of ACA provisions is 
shaped more by citizen and elite political ideology.   
Chapter 3 
Chapter 3 examines whether threat perception influences support for mandatory 
vaccination policies. With the 2014 measles outbreak tied to Disneyland resorts in California in 
2014, we have observed a renewed debate over childhood vaccinations and alleged side effects. 
The success of infant and childhood immunizations programs is one of the most effective health 
interventions of the 20th century and is credited with a substantial portion of the overall increase 
in life expectancy. However, despite the scientific evidence suggesting that the side effects of 
vaccines are minimal, support for the government requiring parents to vaccinate their children is 
mixed. Considerable research has suggested that support for more restrictive public policies is 
influenced by the perception of threat.  
Using data from a nationally representative sample of 1,199 adults conducted after the 
Disneyland measles outbreak, I explore the extent to which the perception of threat influences 
support for mandatory vaccination policies. The results suggest that threat perception and 
political ideology influence support for mandatory vaccination policies. The results also have 
broader implications for the relationship between threat perception and policy ideology as the 




Finally, Chapter 4 examines how emotions (anxiety) towards epidemics of disease 
influence evaluations of government and policy preferences. When public health concerns 
receive considerable attention from politicians and media outlets, public anxiety and fear are 
likely. These emotions limit the ability of the government to communicate risks or prevention 
mechanisms to the public effectively and may influence the public’s confidence in the 
government’s ability to prevent an outbreak in the United States. The recent outbreak of the 
Ebola virus in the Western African countries of Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Liberia provides an 
opportunity to examine how anxiety influences confidence in government and support for more 
restrictive policies to prevent an Ebola outbreak from occurring in the United States 
Using individual-level survey data collected in 2014, this chapter examines whether 
individual anxiety about contracting Ebola influences confidence in the government’s response 
to potential outbreaks in the United States and support for restrictive policies during a health 
crisis. The results suggest that concern about Ebola does influence confidence in government and 
that sociotropic concerns about Ebola predict support for more restrictive policies during times 
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Do Legislators Listen to the Public? Policy Responsiveness and State 




With the passage of the ACA in 2010 by President Obama and the then Democratic – 
controlled House and Senate, health care continues to be a prominent point of conflict between 
national and state policy agendas. This conflict is due to increasing health care costs that 
influence both state and federal budgets through Medicaid. Since the passage of the ACA, public 
attitudes towards the ACA have been divided, even though many support the provisions of the 
ACA. Not surprisingly, most opposition towards the ACA comes from Republican legislators 
and governors who have vigorously fought against creating state-run health insurance1 
marketplaces and the expansion of Medicaid. Despite this, 32 states have decided to expand 
Medicaid and 17 states have created a state-run health insurance marketplace. 
 A basic tenant of democratic theory suggests citizens elect officials to pass laws that are 
in line with their policy preferences. While considerable research has examined the connection 
between policy and public opinion (Lax and Phillips 2009a, 2012; Page and Shapiro 1983), less 
is known about the connection between public opinion and health policy issues. This chapter 
examines the relationship between public opinion and state adoption of provisions of the ACA.  
The analysis proceeds as follows. First, I provide a background of the dilemma states are 
facing with the Medicaid program. Secondly, I outline the two complementary theories that 
allow us to understand both how public opinion influences state decision-making regarding 
                                                 
1 States creating a state-run marketplace are responsible for performing all marketplace functions. For purposes of 
this analysis, federally supported state-run marketplaces were included as well. The only difference is states get IT 





policy and how other external and internal state factors influence state policymaking as well. I 
then test components of these frameworks by employing Event History Analysis (2010 to 2015) 
from the American states in an empirical model of state adoption of provisions of the ACA. 
Finally, I discuss the theoretical and empirical implications of my findings.  
The Medicaid and ACA Dilemma 
 
Medicaid spending is a significant budgetary issue for many states because average 
Medicaid spending accounts for 16.8 percent of state general funds (Heberlein et al. 2011).  Even 
though states are free to run their own Medicaid program, they must follow certain guidelines 
regarding access and benefits in order to receive federal matching funds. Medicaid is a perfect 
example of the delicate balance federal and state governments maintain in regards to policy. As 
with other policy programs operated jointly by the state and federal government, relationships 
concerning Medicaid are often strained with side each wanting to run their program 
independently while minimizing its financial burden (Barrilleaux and Miller 1988).  
These same power-struggles continued when Congress and President Obama passed the 
ACA. While some in the United States were excited about the adoption of the ACA in 2010, not 
everyone shared the same excitement. In fact, when President Obama signed the ACA into law, 
twelve states had already joined a lawsuit with the State of Virginia in challenging the 
constitutionality of the ACA2 (Joondeph 2011).   
The success of the ACA rested upon a two-prong state adoption process. The first was 
through the creation of a health exchange system in which individuals could compare insurance 
plans and select a plan suitable to their needs. The second was through the expansion of 
Medicaid to all citizens under the age of sixty-five earning up to 138 percent of the federal 
                                                 






poverty level. To help states deal with the increased costs associated with the expansion of 
Medicaid, the federal government agreed to subsidize 100 percent of the costs of adding new 
enrollees from 2016, after which the share would gradually decline until 2022 when the 
government will cover 90 percent of the costs (Young 2012). The expansion of Medicaid was the 
primary tool the federal government employed to tackle the health care access problem in the 
United States (Jacobs and Callaghan 2013). However, the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in NIFB v. 
Sebelius in 2012 essentially stripped the mechanism in which the government used to entice to 
Medicaid expansion; as such, states were able to make decisions on the expansion of Medicaid 
absent of fiscal coercion.   
Public Opinion and Health Care   
Most research on the influence of public opinion on health care reform has largely taken 
place at the national level (Blendon et al. 1995; Jacobs 2008). This proposition seems natural 
considering that both Democratic and Republican presidents have tried to reform the U.S. health 
system unsuccessfully over the last half century (Starr 2013). The failure of these attempts is 
partly due to a number of attitudes held by many members of the public about direct massive 
government intervention, self-interest when it comes to health care, and tax-fatigue in regards to 
paying for health care reform (Jacobs and Shapiro 1995).  
 Since the passage of the ACA, public opinion has been divided. Figure 1 below shows 42 
percent of Americans have a favorable opinion towards the ACA and 42 percent of Americans 
have an unfavorable opinion towards the ACA. Taking it a step further, Figure 2 below shows 
public attitudes towards the ACA controlling for party identification; 63 percent of Democrats 





opinion towards the ACA. As both figures show, public opinion towards the ACA is divided and 
is strongly shaped by party identification.    
Figure 1: Public Attitudes Towards the Affordable Care Act 
 






Despite divided opinions on the ACA a majority of Americans approve of certain 
provisions covered by the ACA. After the ACA was passed, a 2011 Kaiser Family Foundation 
poll found that 82 percent of individuals felt the government should continue providing tax 
credits to help small businesses provide health care. In addition, 72 percent felt the government 
should continue providing assistance to individuals who cannot afford health care while 76 
percent approved of the government closing the Medicare “doughnut hole” in prescription costs 
for seniors. Given the divided nature of public opinion on the ACA, should we expect public 
opinion to influence state adoption of provisions of the ACA?3  
Although most scholars agree public opinion influences public policy, what is less agreed 
upon however is the impact of public opinion on public policy (Page 1994). Some argue 
democracy is working as intended with elected officials responding to shifts in public opinion 
(Stimson et al. 1995), while others contend responsiveness can only occur in a limited number of 
policy areas because of the organizational structure of Congress and the public having 
meaningful opinions on only a handful of issues (Jones 1994; Zaller 1992). However, others 
have argued scholars have overestimated the impact of public opinion on policy. For example, 
Page (2002) contends most public opinion polls focus on issues already important to the public 
and the ones in which the public would hold government accountable.  
Other scholars have begun to voice the same concerns; Lax and Phillips (2012) found that 
policy congruence was only present half of the time and certain opinion majorities were needed 
for the policy to have a chance of being adopted. For example, their study found support for 
medical marijuana by citizens in the state have to be approximately 70 percent support for the 
policy to have a 50 percent chance of adoption.        
                                                 
3 Many authors contend this relationship is conditional. Those issues that are more salient to the public and powerful 





Another issue with being able to determine how public opinion influences policy is 
finding reliable measures of state public opinion. Earlier research on policy responsiveness at the 
state level had to rely upon “aggregate liberalism” scores created by researchers like Erikson, 
Wright, and McIver (1993) or Berry et al. (1998) which served as a proxy for measures of public 
opinion. Because of this, previous research on the influence of public opinion on the policy 
process discounted the role of issue-specific opinion, in large part due to voters’ lack of interest 
and knowledge in state politics (Treadway 1985). However, more recently research has 
suggested that state legislators are responsive to issue-specific public opinion. For example, Lax 
and Phillips (2009a) in their study of state adoption of gay rights found a high degree of 
responsiveness, even after controlling for interest group pressure and the ideology of voters and 
elected officials. Similarly, Camobreco and Barnello (2008) found a connection between 
abortion attitudes and state abortion policy.  
While recent studies have continued to examine the influence of public opinion on the 
policy process in areas like the death penalty and same-sex marriage (Lax and Phillips 2009a; 
Lupia et al. 2010; Norrander 2000) these studies have focused on morality issues that are 
especially salient to the general public. Lax and Phillips (2012) examined public opinion on 
health care but these questions were concerned about reducing the number of people who are 
eligible for Medicaid and extending eligibility for the State Children’s Health Insurance Program 
(SCHIP).4 The expansion of Medicaid under the ACA is different because it was more politically 
toxic than SCHIP and called for expanding Medicaid rather than reducing the number of 
individuals eligible for Medicaid.  
 
                                                 





State Policy Innovation and Diffusion 
A traditional model of whether a state adopts a particular policy is influenced by factors 
both internally and externally to the state (Berry and Berry 1990). State diffusion of policy 
innovation is a process of learning; states can learn about policy innovations through observing 
policy alternatives considered by other states, as well as through policy information from 
professional organizations and advocates or interest groups (Boushey 2010; Walker 1969); they 
can then mold or reject policy alternatives based on local considerations and needs (Gray 1973). 
Berry and Berry (1990) explicitly proposed that the probability of a state adopting a policy is a 
function of internal conditions in a state, such as resources and need, as well as factors external 
to a state, such as consideration of a policy by nearby states. In short, state policy adoption is a 
function of state internal demand and constraints, as well as external stimuli and information 
(Berry and Berry 2007).  
State internal characteristics that can influence state adoption of provisions of the ACA 
include the ideology of both the legislature and governor (Barrilleaux and Rainey 2014; 
Callaghan and Jacobs 2014; Dinan 2014; Jacobs and Callaghan 2013). Resources and obstacles 
are additional internal characteristics that can shape the likelihood of policy adoption, and 
include fiscal resources, legislative professionalism, public opinion, and issue saliency (Berry 
and Berry 2007; Boushey 2010; Lax and Phillips 2009a, 2012).  
External forces that can influence state policy adoption typically involve a learning 
process. State actors can learn of a policy in a neighboring state and emulate the policy because 
of the policy success in other states; this neighboring model view assumes states near each other 
share similar internal economic and social conditions (Mooney and Lee 1995; Sylvester and 





However, most applications of the neighborhood model assume geographic proximity is a 
central factor in policy adoption and fail to account for shared state characteristics such as policy 
ideology or public opinion. Grossback et al. (2004) suggests states will emulate policies from 
states that share the same political ideology. Likewise, Pacheco (2012) argues state emulation of 
the policies of other state can be a function of similar public opinion or recent changes in public 
opinion.    
In summary, I expect that state adoption of provisions of the ACA will be best explained 
by public opinion towards the ACA. I also expect state adoption of provisions of the ACA will 
be a function of state internal demands and constraints, as well as information external to a state.  
Research Design and Variable Measurement  
 To study the influence of public opinion on state resistance to provisions of the ACA I 
employ the primary methodology used in state policy adoption research – Event History 
Analysis (EHA), which assumes discrete non-repeatable events. The technique is based on the 
structure of the data set and requires the use of logit or probit regression models (Berry and 
Berry 2007). The benefit of EHA is that it captures external policy diffusion and internal state 
determinants of policy adoption. Another benefit of EHA is that it allows researchers to examine 
differences between states in a cross-sectional design of all 50 states with a longitudinal 
component for each state. For this study, the years from 2010 (the first year any state adopted) to 
2015 are examined.5 
Dependent Variable  
 As is typical in an EHA, model the dependent variable is coded one if a state has 
expanded Medicaid or created a state-run health exchange and zero otherwise; in addition, if the 
                                                 
5 The first adoption by a state for Medicaid expansion occurred in 2012 while the first state-run health marketplace 





policy is adopted in a given state-year no additional state-years are included in the dataset for 
that state. By 2015, thirty-two states had expanded Medicaid to their citizens and seventeen 
states had created a state-based marketplace/federally-supported marketplace (See Appendix A-
C for more information on all variables and data sources).  
Independent Variables 
State Internal Factors: Many scholars have put forth paths by which policy can be shaped by 
policy-specific opinion and citizen ideology. For example, Mayhew (1974) argued that the 
primary motivation for legislators to be responsive to constituents is the desire to be reelected. 
Although Mayhew’s argument was framed in the national context, state legislators, just like their 
national counterparts, are concerned about reelection. Should one expect health care policies to 
be responsive to policy-specific opinion, citizen ideology, or both?    
The method most commonly used to estimate state-level opinion is disaggregation, 
championed by Erikson, Wright, and McIver (1993). Disaggregation involves combining a large 
set of national polls and then calculate the opinion percentages for each state. One of the 
drawbacks of disaggregation is that a large number of national surveys are required, typically 
over an extended time period (i.e. 25 years), to create a sufficient sample size within each state. 
Another drawback of disaggregation is that even with a sufficient sample over an extended time 
period, smaller states or those seldom surveyed often are dropped from the sample.  
 An alternative method exists to simulate state opinion using national surveys. Multilevel 
regression and poststratification, or MRP, is the latest implementation (Gelman and Little 1997; 
Lax and Phillips 2009a, 2009b; Park, Gelman, and Bafumi 2006; see Sniders and Bosker [2012] 
for a comprehensive review of multilevel models). In the first stage of the MRP process, a 





of demographics and geographic predictors: individual responses are nested within states nested 
within regions and demographic groupings (i.e. education, race, gender). While disaggregation 
relies solely upon demographic differences among states, the MRP method allows the use of 
state-level effects not available at the individual level (i.e. uninsured rate, presidential vote, etc.) 
in addition to the demographic differences of the state. 
 The second stage of the MRP process is a poststratification; The estimates for each 
demographic-geographic respondent type are weighted (poststratified) by the percentages of each 
type in actual state populations. Poststratification allows the model to estimate the percentage of 
respondents within each state that have a favorable opinion towards a policy such as the ACA. 
The poststratification process corrects for clustering and other statistical issues that are prevalent 
in disaggregation estimates (see Norrander 2007, 154). To estimate the influence of citizen 
ideology and policy-specific opinion towards the ACA I use the variables Citizen Ideology and 
Policy-Specific Opinion. To measure state ideology, I used Berry et al.’s measure of mass 
liberalism or citizen ideology (Berry et al. 1998) which is based on a 0 to 100 scale with a higher 
number signifying the ideology of the state is more liberal. The expectation is that as citizen 
ideology becomes more liberal, states will be more likely to adopt provisions of the ACA. To 
measure policy-specific opinion I pool individual responses to the following question from the 
Kaiser Family Foundation Health Tracker Poll:  
 “Given what you know about the health reform law, do you have a generally favorable 
or generally unfavorable opinion of it?” 
 
Table 1 shows opinion estimates and descriptive statistics. There is significant variation in policy 








Table 1: Opinion Estimates and Summary Statistics 
 
State 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Mean 
Opinion
Alabama 45 39 44 37 38 41
Alaska 43 40 40 39 35 39
Arizona 46 43 41 41 41 42
Arkansas 40 36 41 31 36 37
California 60 55 59 53 52 56
Colorado 51 47 50 42 42 46
Connecticut 53 52 58 49 46 52
Delaware 53 48 61 48 47 51
Florida 47 45 50 44 42 46
Georgia 50 46 50 43 41 46
Hawaii 64 61 68 60 63 63
Idaho 37 35 33 33 31 34
Illinois 52 50 56 48 49 51
Indiana 42 38 46 35 37 40
Iowa 43 40 50 37 39 42
Kansas 38 35 42 34 36 37
Kentucky 38 36 40 32 37 37
Louisiana 48 42 49 39 42 44
Maine 47 46 53 44 43 47
Maryland 60 57 65 55 55 58
Massachusetts 55 55 62 57 49 56
Michigan 48 48 53 45 43 47
Minnesota 45 45 53 43 44 46
Mississippi 52 46 54 47 45 49
Missouri 42 36 45 35 37 39
Montana 41 39 30 35 33 36
Nebraska 36 36 40 32 34 36
Nevada 53 49 47 45 43 47
New Hampshire 45 45 50 41 40 44
New Jersey 55 50 57 61 49 54
New Mexico 52 49 50 48 42 48
New York 59 57 64 54 51 57
North Carolina 50 44 52 43 43 46
North Dakota 35 34 39 30 33 34
Ohio 46 41 50 40 39 43
Oklahoma 36 33 36 29 32 33
Oregon 49 50 50 48 44 48
Pennsylvania 48 42 52 44 40 45
Rhode Island 56 53 61 52 47 54
South Carolina 48 41 50 39 41 44
South Dakota 36 34 41 32 40 37
Tennessee 42 37 43 35 38 39
Texas 42 43 41 38 36 40
Utah 34 33 31 30 30 32
Vermont 55 54 62 52 47 54
Virginia 50 47 54 43 43 47
Washington 53 51 55 48 44 50
West Virginia 35 31 37 30 31 33
Wisconsin 44 43 52 42 42 45
Wyoming 35 31 29 28 28 30
Mean 47 44 49 42 41 44
SD 8 8 9 8 7 8
Notes: Estimates of policy support for the Patient Protection Affordable Care Act are 





in Wyoming at 28 percent while individual support for the ACA was highest in Hawaii at 59 
percent. The expectation is that as individual-level support in the state increases so too does the 
likelihood that the state will adopt provisions of the ACA.   
Research also suggests political factors, mainly party control of the state legislature and 
governor, impact whether or not a state will adopt or resist a federal policy (Doan and McFarlane 
2012; Nicholson-Crotty 2009; Gilardi 2010). Early research on the actions of states towards the 
ACA have confirmed this research. For example, Barrilleaux and Rainey (2014) found state 
resistance to Medicaid expansion was a product of the composition of the state legislature and 
governors.   
Ideology not only influences how a state may decide to fund Medicaid, but also 
influences how legislatures and governors interpret new information (Gilardi 2010). In his 
analysis of unemployment benefits, Gilardi found that “ideological positions and prior beliefs 
about the effectiveness of policies shape the interpretation of new evidence and make policy 
makers react differently to information coming from the experience of others, which helps them 
assess both the political and policy potential of alternatives” (2010, 660-661). He found that 
governments that were more conservative were more sensitive to information when they dealt 
with electoral consequences of reforms, while those governments that tended to be more liberal 
were more likely to be influenced by the actual policy effect. To test the influence party control 
has on the state legislature I include a Legislative Ideology measure developed by Berry et al. 
(1998) and updated on Richard Fording’s website with scores to 2015 
(https://rcfording.wordpress.com/state-ideology-data/). A higher score is associated with greater 
aggregate liberalism in a state legislature. I use legislative ideology instead of partisanship 





parts of the country (i.e. a southern Democrats tends to be different from a northern Democrat) to 
be accounted for (Berry et al. 1998; Sylvester and Haider-Markel 2015). The expectation is a 
state with a more liberal state legislature will be more likely to adopt provisions of the ACA. To 
measure partisanship of the Governor, I include the variable Governor. The variable is coded one 
for a Democratic governor and zero for a Republican governor. The expectation is states with a 
Democratic governor will be more likely to adopt provisions of the ACA.    
Aside from ideology, because of the technical nature and budget management needed to 
implement the ACA at the state level, professionalism in the state legislature should play a role 
in the policy process. More professionalized legislatures are better able to identify problems and 
should increase responsiveness to public opinion (Boushey 2010; Lax and Phillips 2009a). I 
included a measure of State Legislative Professionalism based on the Squire (2012) 
Professionalism Index.  
Finally, state legislators are not expected to be responsive to every issue equally. 
Therefore, a measure of salience for a particular issue must be included in a legislator’s electoral 
calculus. For less salient issues elites may be unaware of their constituents’ views; however, 
when the public does care about a particular issue, the expectation is that the government should 
do what the people want (Burstein 2014). To control for salience, I constructed Issue Salience: 
State News which measures the annual number of Google searches that included the words 
“Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,” “Health Care,” “Affordable Health Care,” 
“Affordable Health Insurance,” “Obama Care,” and “Affordable Health Care Act.” 
External Variables: Following earlier efforts to model the potential influence of nearby states on 





external forces. The first variable, Neighbor Adoption,6 captures geographical diffusion 
(Chamberlain and Haider-Markel 2005; Mooney 2001); it ranges from zero to 100 and is the 
percentage of contagious neighboring states that have adopted an interlock policy in the previous 
year. Here I assume that states are attentive to the policy actions of their neighbors; if multiple 
neighboring states adopt a policy, a state will be more likely to see the law as a viable policy 
option.  
 For the second measure of external forces, I follow Grossback et al. (2004) and argue 
states may learn from and emulate states with similar ideological preferences. If policy-adopting 
states are distant in terms of ideology, it is unlikely those states would be an unlikely candidate 
to use as a model to solve policy problems. Like Grossback et al. (2004) and Sylvester and 
Haider-Markel (2015) I measure Policy Diffusion: Ideological Distance by utilizing the state 
government liberalism indicator created by Berry et al. (1998) along with the status of state 
adoption of provisions of the ACA in the following formula: 
𝑰𝒅𝒆𝒐𝒍𝒐𝒈𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒍 𝑫𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 = 𝑨𝑩𝑺 (𝑷𝒓𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒐𝒖𝒔 𝑨𝒅𝒐𝒑𝒕𝒆𝒓 − 𝑷𝒐𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝑨𝒅𝒐𝒑𝒕𝒆𝒓) 
The value for previous adopter was achieved by taking the average of all state government 
ideologies that had previously adopted provisions of the ACA. This value is then calculated for 
each year in the dataset. It is expected those states that are further away ideologically from states 
that have already adopted provisions from the ACA should be less likely to expand provisions of 
the ACA.   
 
 
                                                 
6 Alaska and Hawaii have no actual neighbors but were included in the analysis considering Washington and Oregon 
as neighboring state for Alaska, and considering Washington, Oregon, and California as neighboring states for 





Results and Discussion 
 Previous research has found a clear relationship between voter ideology and state policy 
(Erikson et al. 1993; Stimson et al. 2002). However, others have found that general attitudes 
towards various issues better map with policy outcomes. For example, Haider-Markel and 
Kaufman (2006) found a connection between attitudes towards homosexuals and state bans on 
gay marriage. Similarly, Brace et al. (2002) found a connection between attitude measures from 
the GSS and state attributes. They found state attitudes towards feminism is strongly related to 
the percentage of each state’s legislature made up of women. 
 Scholars have primarily focused on attitudes and ideology because it is unreasonable to 
expect detailed policy preferences from voters and unrealistic to assume elected representatives 
are mindful of voters’ policy preferences. Lax and Phillips (2009a, 2009b, 2012) however make 
the argument that scholars don’t use state-level policy preferences because the lack of 
comparable opinion polls across states. This leads to a puzzling question: which measure is 
driving state adoption of provisions of the ACA? Is it citizen ideology? Or is it policy-specific 
opinion?  
 One of the difficulties with trying to disentangle the relationship between public opinion 
and state resistance to the ACA is the high correlation between public opinion, legislative 
ideology, and citizen ideology. For example, the correlation between legislative ideology and 
policy-specific opinion is 0.62. Similarly, the correlation between citizen ideology and policy-
specific opinion in 0.72. To untangle the relationship, I conducted a path analysis showing the 
direct and indirect association between policy-specific opinion, legislative ideology, and citizen 





Figure 4 presents a path analysis for state expansion of Medicaid. Coefficients are 
standardized so that the variances of both the dependent and independent variables are 1. First, 
the path analysis shows citizen ideology has a direct effect on legislative ideology (β=1.39, 
p<.000). Secondly, citizen ideology has an indirect effect on policy-specific opinion (β=0.72, 
p<.000). Finally, citizen ideology (β=0.44, p<.000), legislative ideology (β=0.58, p<.000), and 
policy-specific opinion (β=0.29, p<.000) have a direct effect on state expansion of Medicaid. 
This suggests that citizen ideology is the primary driver for legislative ideology. Furthermore, 
the path analysis shows that citizen ideology is the primary driver for policy-specific opinion. 
Thus, all three are important to predicting whether or not a state expands Medicaid.   
Figure 4: Path Analysis of Attitudes Towards the ACA – Medicaid Expansion 
 
 
When examining the indirect and direct association between policy-specific opinion, 
legislative ideology, and citizen ideology towards the creation of a state-run marketplace (see 
Figure 5), many of the same patterns that were present in the path analysis for Medicaid 
expansion are also present with the path analysis for state-run marketplaces. First, citizen 





has an indirect effect on policy-specific opinion (β=0.69, p<.000). Finally, both legislative 
ideology (β=0.42, p<.000) and policy-specific opinion (β=0.35, p<.000) have a direct effect on a 
state creating a state-run health marketplace. However, it appears that citizen ideology has no 
direct effect on the creation of a state-run marketplace (β=0.08, p<.011). One potential reason for 
the non-findings with citizen ideology is the explanatory power of the relationship is being 
already being captured by policy-specific opinion and legislative ideology.   
Figure 5: Path Analysis of Attitudes Towards the ACA – Health Exchanges 
 
 
With the path analysis establishing that there is both a direct and indirect effect between 
policy-specific opinion, legislative ideology, citizen ideology, and state adoption of provisions of 
the ACA, Tables 2 and 3 display the results of a multivariate logit model predicting state 
expansion of Medicaid and the creation of state-run marketplaces.  
Consistent with expectations, the results suggest that policy-specific opinion influences 
whether a state expands Medicaid and creates a state-run or federally-supported marketplace. 
Similarly, legislative ideology and citizen ideology are significant in the expected direction. 





citizens are more concerned with as issue particularly important to them, is also significant in the 
expected direction.   
Table 2: Determinants of State Resistance to the ACA – Medicaid Expansion 
 
 
In those states where citizens have paid more attention to issues dealing the ACA, states are less 
likely to expand Medicaid in their state and are more likely to defer to a federally-controlled 
marketplace.  
Finally, legislative professionalism has mixed results. For example, with state expansion 
of Medicaid legislative professionalism is significant in the expected direction; however, with 






Because past research suggests that more professional legislators are able to deal with 
more complex policies, the results are surprising (Boushey 2010). While the expansion of 
Medicaid in a state is complicated, whether a state expands its Medicaid program was more 
Table 3: Determinants of State Resistance to the ACA – State-Run Health Marketplaces 
 
politically toxic for legislatures but not technical in nature. However, the creation of a state-run 
or federally-supported marketplace was extremely technical. 
 In addition to internal factors, external factors were also examined. Following previous 
diffusion literature (Grossback et al. 2004; Sylvester and Haider-Markel 2015) the results 
suggest that states respond to the actions of states that are ideologically similar. Likewise, at least 





influences state actions regarding the ACA. One possible explanation for the non-findings with 
geographic proximity regarding Medicaid expansion could be because of the requirement for 
states to set up some sort of health exchange while being able to opt out of the Medicaid 
expansion provision.   
In summary, consistent with previous research, the results indicate that public opinion 
does influence whether or not a state adopts provisions of the ACA. In those states with a more 
favorable opinion towards the ACA states are more likely to expand Medicaid and create a state-
run or federally-supported health marketplace. Legislative ideology can also shape policymaking 
– in states with more liberal legislatures Medicaid expansion and state-run marketplaces are 
more likely to be adopted.  
 Although the EHA models tell us something about the influence of various factors on 
state action towards the ACA, what is the substantive impact of these factors? Estimating the 
predicted probabilities from the theoretical relevant variables in the model gives some sense of 
the substantive impact. To obtain the predicted values I moved each variable from one standard 
deviation to two standard deviations holding all other variables at their mean (see last column in 
Tables 2 and 3). For example, states that have a greater favorability towards the ACA are 21 
percent more likely to expand Medicaid than those states that have an unfavorable opinion 
towards the ACA. Additionally, states with a more liberal legislature are 44 percent more likely 
to expand Medicaid than those states with a more conservative legislature. Finally, states with a 
more liberal citizenry are 25 percent more likely to expand Medicaid. Thus, key variables in the 
models do show a modest substantive impact on the likelihood that a state will take action 







 Since the ACA passed in 2010, states have exhibited fierce resistance to the ACA and the 
public has continued to remain divided. Many of the states that have resisted stand to benefit 
more from expanding Medicaid.7 This chapter set out to examine what impact public opinion has 
had on state adoption of provisions of the ACA. Below I summarize my conclusions and a few 
implications of my findings.   
Scholars have long tried to disentangle the relationship between the influence of citizen 
ideology, legislative ideology, and policy-specific opinion on state adoption of policies. Most 
research involving the ACA have established a relationship between legislative ideology and 
state actions towards the ACA (Barrilleaux and Rainey 2014; Jacobs and Callaghan 2013). 
However, scholars have been unable to find a link between public opinion and states’ actions 
towards the ACA. As such, this chapter set out to examine that relationship. Making use of EHA 
with time series data from public opinion polls and data from American states, this chapter 
sought to weigh in on this debate and draw several important conclusions.     
 First, contrary to previous research (Barrilleaux and Rainey 2014) the findings here 
suggest that elected officials are responsive to their citizen’s policy-specific opinions even after 
controlling for citizen ideology and legislature ideology. However, there are some caveats to this 
conclusion. While policy-specific opinion is statistically significant in the expected direction, the 
substantive influence of policy-specific opinion towards Medicaid expansion is stronger than for 
creating state-run health marketplaces. One reason for this is that Medicaid expansion was more 
known to the general public compared to the creation of health marketplaces.  
                                                 
7 States that don’t expand Medicaid don’t lose any funding but do not receive any new federal money. For some 
states this could be billions of dollars. Also by expanding Medicaid states could eliminate the coverage gap that was 





 Secondly, research has shown that responsiveness is higher for policies that are highly 
salient but for policies that are less salient, voters are less likely to get what they want (Lax and 
Phillips 2009a). The results here show that in states where the ACA is more salient states are less 
likely to adopt provisions of the ACA. This suggests that not only are states being responsive to 
citizens’ desires to adopt provisions of the ACA but are also responsive to the citizens’ desire to 
not implement provisions of the ACA.  
 Finally, this study has demonstrated the value of estimating policy-specific opinion. 
While previous research has mainly focused on issues of morality this study suggests that the 
application of aggregate state-level opinion on policy issues can be applied to other areas, in this 
case health policy issues. However, future research should examine how often legislators are 
congruent with policy-specific opinion with respect to the ACA. Also, future research should 
also examine what level of support for the ACA is needed for elected officials to be responsive 



















Medicaid Expansion State has not expanded 
Medicaid is coded 0 while 
states that have expanded 
Medicaid are coded 1.
Kaiser State Health 
Facts about the ACA 
Creation of State-Run Health 
Marketplace
State defaulted to a federally 
controlled marketplace coded 
0 while states that created a 
state-run marketplace are 
coded 1. 
Kaiser State Health 
Facts about the ACA 
Independent Variables 
Policy-Specific Opinion Measure of state favorbility 
towards the ACA on a 0 to 1 
scale. Higher measures 
signify more favoriable 
opinions towards the ACA 
Kaiser Family Health 
Foundation Health 
Tracker Polls. 
Legislative Ideology Measure of state legislator 
ideology on a 0 to 1 scale. 
Higher value signify more 
liberal legislative bodies.
Constructed based on 
Government Ideology 
Scale by Berry, 
Fording, and Hanson 
(1998)
Legislative Professionalism Measure of state legislative 
professionalism. Takes into 
account salary and benefits, 





Citizen Ideology State citizens' liberal-to-
conservative ideology score 
on a 0 to 1 scale; higer scores 
indicate greater liberalism 








Governor Variable coded 0 if the 
governor is Republican and 1 
if the governor is Democratic 
between 2010 and 2015
Klaner 1934-2015 
Governor Data 
Policy Learning: Ideology Absolute difference of state 
ideology between potential 
adopters and previous 
adopters lagged one year
Constructed based on 
Government Ideology 
Scale by Berry, 
Fording, and Hanson 
(1998) and the 
formula from 
Grossback et al. 
(2004)
Issue Salience: State News Number of google searches 
per state using the following 
words: “Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act,” 
“Health Care,” “Affordable 
Health Care,” “Affordable 
Health Insurance,” “Obama 
Care,” and “Affordable 
Health Care Act.”
Google Trends 
Neighbor Adoption Percentage of neighboring 
states adopting provisions of 
the ACA.
Constructed by 
author based on the 
Kaiser State Health 
Facts about the ACA 
and Chamberlain and 
Haider-Markel 
(2005)
Policy Learning: Ideology Absolute difference of state 
ideology between potential 
adopters and previous 
adopters 
Constructed based on 
Government Ideology 
Scale by Berry, 
Fording, and Hanson 
(1998) and the 
formula from 
Grossback et al. 







Appendix B: Descriptive Statistics for Medicaid Expansion Model 
 
  









Mean Min Max S.D. N 
State Expansion of Medicaid - 0 1 0.414 138
Policy-Specific Opinion 43.16 28.23 67.51 8.12 200
Legislative Ideology 41.23 2.58 91.45 31.22 200
Legislative Professionalism 0.19 0.0061 0.61 0.12 200
Citizen Ideology 49.36 13.48 91.85 16.16 200
Governor - 0 1 0.49 200
Issue Salience: State News 251.62 52 508.00 103.8 200
Neighbor Adoption 0.46 0 1 0.37 200
Policy Diffusion: Ideological Distance 33.25 0.96 72.75 19.62 150
Mean Min Max S.D. N 
State-Run Health Marketplace - 0 1 0.3 224
Policy-Specific Opinion 43.85 28.23 67.51 7.99 300
Legislative Ideology 41.88 2.58 91.45 31.17 300
Legislative Professionalism 0.19 0.0061 0.61 0.12 300
Citizen Ideology 49.87 13.48 91.85 15.51 300
Governor - 0 1 0.49 300
Issue Salience: State News 209.68 32 508.00 113.59 300
Neighbor Adoption 0.37 0 1 0.37 300
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Threat and Loathing in a (Un)Vaccinated World: The Role of Perceived Threat in Public 
Support for Restrictive Vaccination Policies  
 
When the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) announced in 2014 that a 
measles outbreak was connected to the Disneyland resorts in California, debates over 
vaccinations and their alleged side effects intensified. The success of infant and childhood 
immunizations programs is one of the most effective health interventions of the 20th century and 
is credited with a substantial portion of the overall increase in life expectancy (Gellin et al. 
2000). However, while coverage levels for most childhood vaccines remains high, numerous 
studies have documented that vaccine-related confidence has decreased among U.S. parents over 
the past several years. For example, in a national study of parents measuring concerns towards 
vaccines done in 2009, 50 percent of parents indicated they had “concerns about vaccines” 
compared to 19 percent when a similar survey was conducted in 2000 (Gowda and Dempsey 
2013).   
 No vaccine is 100% effective; the success of vaccination programs relies on a concept 
known as “herd immunity,” which occurs when a significant portion of a community is 
immunized against a contagious disease. While the actual percentage necessary to achieve herd 
immunity varies for each potential disease, it generally ranges from 83 to 94 percent (Plans-
Rubio 2012). Simply put, if fewer people are vaccinated, a greater portion of the population 
could be at higher risk of contracting preventable diseases. Vaccines have become a victim of 
their own success; because many parents have not been exposed to diseases that have long since 
been suppressed, the risks associated with receiving vaccines garner more attention than the 





In many ways, the anti-vaccination movement represents a classic example of both the 
free-rider problem and the “tragedy of the commons” (May 2005). In his classic work The Logic 
of Collective Action, Mancur Olson explains the free rider problem: “In a large, latent group 
there will be no tendency for the group to organize to achieve its goals through the voluntary, 
rational action of the members of the group, even if there is perfect consensus” (1971, pg. 59-
60). In other words, free riders rely on other members of the group in order to take risks and still 
benefit from the goals of the group. Because of heard immunity, the inaction of one parent who 
refuses to vaccinate their children is difficult to detect. However, if enough parents refuse to 
vaccinate their children, the “herd immunity” or collective good can be lost entirely – often 
referred to in policy literature as the ‘tragedy of the commons’ (Ostrom 1990; Ostrom et al. 
2006).  
 Hardin (1982) argues the type of free-rider collective action problem caused by parents 
delaying or forgoing childhood vaccinations can be solved through compulsory vaccination laws. 
However, forcing parents to vaccinate their children in opposition to their personal or religious 
beliefs presents a dilemma “in a society that values individual freedoms…” (May 2005, 414). 
With vaccines becoming a contentious political topic, it is necessary to understand why some 
individuals support mandatory vaccination policies while others do not. Recent research on the 
role of threat perception and its effect on attitudes towards policies may provide some answers.     
The central question of this chapter is whether support for restrictive vaccination policies 
is influenced by an individual’s threat perception—here the perception that an outbreak of 
measles in their community is imminent. While considerable research has examined the 
influence that threat perception has on support for counterterrorism policies (Gadarian 2010; 





date little work has examined how threat perception influences support for vaccination policies; 
this paper seeks to fill that gap.  
Opposition to Government Compulsory Laws 
One area in which the government has played an integral role in the health system is the 
eradication of preventable diseases through vaccination. The first U.S. law to require a 
vaccination was passed in Massachusetts in 1809. The law, which required the smallpox 
vaccination, was subsequently ruled constitutional in the landmark case Jacobson v. 
Massachusetts in which the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in favor of the rights of states to pass and 
enforce compulsory vaccination laws (Omer et al. 2009).  
Individuals who are opposed to mandatory vaccination policies typically voice one of 
three main concerns. The first concern is religious freedom. Novotny et al. (1988) found that 
individuals who base their objections to mandatory vaccinations on religious freedom grounds 
generally oppose vaccinations under all circumstances, even in the context of an outbreak.  
Similarly, Warriach (2009) found that some Muslim groups felt it was subverting the will of 
God. Christian Scientists forgo some or all medical help for disease, but instead believe that 
healing for disease occurs through prayer (Grabenstein 2012). Although each denomination has 
their reason for being opposed to compulsory laws, the common element is that mandatory 
vaccinations violate their ability to freely exercise their religious beliefs (Lantos et al. 2012).    
 The second argument most often made in opposition to mandatory vaccinations is based 
on political ideas rather than religious freedoms. Lantos et al. (2012) argues that individuals who 
advocate for less government intrusion feel “…there is a strong presumption against 
governments’ ability to compel medical treatment of any kind or to compel any other violation of 





constitutes criminal assault” (pg. 134). Indeed, this was the primary argument put forth by 
Henning Jacobson in Jacobson v. Massachusetts. Although, it is true personal belief and 
religious exemptions are available in many states exempting parents from vaccinating their 
children,1 some states have recently begun passing laws limiting the use of these exemptions by 
parents.2    
 Finally, opposition to mandatory vaccination laws comes from those concerned that a 
number of vaccines might have negative health consequences. These parents are described as 
“vaccine hesitant” (Kestenbaum and Feemster 2015). Domachowske and Suryadevara (2013) 
argue that the number of vaccines included in the immunization schedule, a resentment about the 
government towards vaccine mandates, and a lack of trust towards public health officials all 
influence vaccine hesitancy. Parental hesitancy towards vaccines also includes concerns about 
the link between autism and vaccines. Even though the link between autism and vaccines is not 
supported by science, the personal experiences and vivid stories of parents who have children 
diagnosed with autism shortly after receiving vaccinations is what sticks in people’s minds and 
not dry statistics (Pitney Jr. 2015).   
Vaccines provide an interesting test case to understand whether threat perception 
influences support for vaccination policies because there are two different threats that parents 
perceive. On one hand it is understandable for parents who are concerned about the side effects 
of vaccinations to be wary of the government mandating vaccinations. On the other hand, it is 
also understandable for parents to be concerned about the potential threat unvaccinated children 
                                                          
1 As of January 21, 2016 18 states (WA, OR, ID, UT, AZ, CO, ND, OK, TX, MN, MO, AR, LA, WI, MI, OH, PA, 
ME) provide for both religious and personal exemptions; and 28 states (NV, MT, QY, NM, SD, NE, KS, IA, IL, IN, 
KY, TN, AL, FL, GA, SC, NC, VA, NY, VT, NH, MA, RI, CT, NJ, DE, MD) and the District of Columbia allow 
for religious exemptions. 





or adults may have on their children when interacting with them in the community or local 
schools. 
The Influence of Threat and Support for Vaccination Policies 
Threat perceptions (i.e. the belief about a potential harm) are components of most 
theories of health behavior (for reviews, see Cameron 2003; Leventhal et al. 1999; Rogers 1975; 
Sutton 1987; Weinstein 1993; and Witte 1992). However, most theories of health behavior have 
mainly focused on the influence of threat on individual participation within the health system. 
For example, the Health Belief Model (HBM) developed in the early 1950s was an attempt to 
understand “the widespread failure to accept disease preventives or screening tests for the early 
detection of asymptomatic disease” (Rosenstock 1974). The HBM has since been applied to 
understanding patients’ response to symptoms (Kirscht 1974) and adherence to prescribed 
medical regimen (Becker 1974). 
HBM focuses on two key variables: (1) the value an individual places on a particular 
goal; and (2) the individual’s estimate of the likelihood that a given action will achieve that goal 
(Janz and Becker 1984). So, if an individual values the benefits vaccines provide, and has the 
belief the vaccination will prevent themselves or their family from contracting a disease, the 
HBM predicts the individual will participate and receive the vaccination. Here I will be applying 
the HBM to understand how threat perception influences support for mandatory vaccination 
policies.  
 In order to test this relationship, I develop a framework derived from the assumptions put 
forth by the HBM. Figure 1 below outlines the assumptions for how an individual’s perception of 










The framework begins with an individual’s perception of how likely it is that a potential 
threat may occur (i.e. how likely is it that there will be an outbreak of a disease in your 
community). As was stated earlier, one of the basic assumptions of the HBM is the value of 
supporting a certain action (i.e. either getting a vaccine or supporting a particular policy). In the 
case of mandatory vaccination policies, the potential value that an individual could place on 
supporting mandatory vaccination policies is by ensuring the herd immunity is maintained in 
their area. If an individual perceives a potential outbreak of measles will occur in the community, 
the value for an individual to support mandatory vaccination policies is ensuring the herd 
immunity is maintained in their community. This is accomplished by requiring parents to 
vaccinate their children and limit school participation of unvaccinated children.  
 While threat perception has not been widely utilized to study how threat may influence 
support for health policies, Cacciatore et al. (2015) recently studied how awareness of the 2014-
2015 U.S. measles outbreak influenced vaccine – related concerns as well as confidence in and 
support for state vaccination mandates. The study found that individuals who were aware of the 





mandatory vaccinations. While Cacciatore et al. (2015) focus their study on how level of 
awareness influences support of vaccination policies, I focus on how the perception of threat (i.e. 
how likely it is that there will be an outbreak of a disease in your community) influences support 
for mandatory vaccination policies.  
Studying the impact of how threat perception on support for public policies is not new, 
but has mainly been applied to studies examining individual support for counterterrorism 
policies. For example, Davis and Silver (2004) found that individuals who were more concerned 
about a future terrorist attacks were more likely to support counterterrorism policies that limit 
civil liberties but provide for additional securities. Similarly, Huddy et al. (2005) find that 
individuals who perceive an imminent terrorist attack in the United States were more likely to 
support antiterrorism policies that restricted civil liberties. Individual perceptions of threat lead 
citizens to support policies that they believe will neutralize the source of the threat and protect 
them (Gadarian 2010; Gordon and Arian 2001; Haider-Markel and Joslyn 2006). In terms of 
vaccination requirements, if parents perceive a threat in their community or school it is expected 
that they would be more likely to support mandatory vaccination policies and restrict 
participation in schools from children who have not been vaccinated.   
The framework also includes modifying factors that may influence support for mandatory 
vaccination policies. These factors, typically associated with heightened concern or hesitancy 
towards vaccines, include age, gender, race, education, income. For example, Kennedy et al. 
(2005) found that parents who were white, more educated, and had higher levels of income were 
more likely to support mandatory vaccination policies. Shui et al. (2006) in their study of how 
race and ethnicity influence attitudes toward vaccines found parents of Hispanic descent were 





employing does not allow me to directly measure confidence towards vaccines, but using 
variables commonly found to be associated with concern towards vaccinations may provide 
additional support in explaining who may be more likely to support mandatory vaccination 
policies or restrict participation in school activities from children who have not been vaccinated.  
Finally, political ideology could influence support for mandatory vaccination policies. 
Existing research has not been able to establish a link between attitudes towards vaccines and 
political ideology, but recent tests of Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) have suggested that 
individual attitudes and behaviors are influenced by moral intuitions. MFT posits individuals use 
a battery of psychological modules (i.e. care/harm, fairness/cheating, loyalty/betrayal, 
authority/subversion, and disgust/purity) to make evaluative judgements based on moral 
approval or disapproval (Haidt and Graham 2007). A sixth category liberty/oppression, which is 
based on a study of libertarians, is characterized by a desire to be free from government intrusion 
and restrictions of freedoms (Iyer et al. 2012). In line with this perspective other studies have 
demonstrated that liberals and conservatives make different evaluative judgments based on 
morals. For example, Graham et al. (2009) found that liberals tend to base their evaluative 
judgments on care/harm compared to conservatives. Although I am not able to directly test the 
assumptions of the MFT, I am presuming that attitudes towards vaccines are heavily intertwined 
with moral judgments (Shaw et al. 2016). As such, the expectation is that liberals will be more 
likely to support mandatory vaccination policies while conservatives will be less likely to 
support such policies.  
Data and Methods 
The next step is to explore empirically the influence of threat on support for mandatory 





children who have not been vaccinated. A national random sample survey of 1,199 adults 
conducted from February 12 to 15, 2015, provides an excellent opportunity to test this question.3 
The next section outlines the dependent and independent variables taken from the survey that 
were used in the analysis.     
Dependent Variables 
Support for Mandatory Vaccinations: The first dependent variable measures individual support 
for mandatory vaccination policies (See Appendix A for coding scheme). Specifically, 
respondents were asked, “Do you think parents should or should not be required to have their 
children vaccinated against preventable diseases such as measles, mumps and rubella or polio if 
the children are healthy enough to be vaccinated?” Figure 2 shows the distribution of responses.  
Table 1: Support for Requiring Parents to Vaccinate Their Children 
 
Approximately 17 percent answered that parents should not be required to vaccinate their 
children while the remaining 83 percent thought that parents should be required to vaccinate their 
children. 
Participation in School Activities: In addition to measuring individual support for mandatory 
vaccination policies, I utilize questions that ask respondents their opinions towards restricting 
                                                          
3 A sample of 1,199 of national adults with an oversample of blacks was recruited by Opinion Research 
Corporation to participate in a study measuring political attitudes on the economy, ISIS, race relations, vaccinations, 
and the 2016 Presidential election. The survey was fielded from February 12 – June 15, 2015. Respondents were 
contacted via landline telephone and cellular phones.     
 
Percent 
Should Not Be Required 17%
Should Be Required 83%
Total 100%
Notes: Data are from a February 12-15, 2015 survey of American adults.





children from school participation who are not vaccinated (See Appendix A for coding scheme). 
Specifically, respondents were asked, “If a child has not been vaccinated, even though he or she 
is healthy enough to receive vaccines, do you think that child should be allowed to participate in 
each of the following activities (public school, private school, daycare), or not?” As is shown in 
Table 2 individuals across all types of school (i.e. public, private, and daycare) felt that children 
who are not vaccinated should not be able to participate in school activities.  
Table 2: Support for Restricting School Participation for Unvaccinated Children 
 
Interestingly though, when individuals were asked about children participation in private school 
the responses were more evenly disbursed. Approximately 52 percent answered that children 
who are not vaccinated should not be able to participate in activities at private schools while the 
remaining 48 percent thought that children who are not vaccinated should be able to participate 
in activities at private schools.  
Independent Variables  
Threat Perception: As was established earlier, most theories on health behavior measure the 
influence of threat on individual participation in the health system. However, most studies only 
examine how the perception of threat influences action and only consider the perception of threat 
as a moderating variable instead of the primary driver. Brewer et al. (2007) argues that one of the 
major problems in testing whether threat perception motivates action is the failure to condition 
the threat question on not taking action. While the action Brewer et al. (2007) is referring to in 
their article is in reference to getting a vaccine, I argue that not only should perception of threat 
Public School Private School Daycare 
Should Be Able To Participate 38% 48% 35%
Should Not Be Able To Participate 62% 52% 64%
Total 100% 100% 100%
Notes: Data are from a February 12-15, 2015 survey of American adults. The number of 





be used as a primary driver of action within the health system, but it also should be used to help 
explain how threat influences support for more restrictive health policies. This is consistent with 
previous literature on how threat influences support for counterterrorism policies (Davis and 
Silver 2004; Huddy et al. 2005).  
 Respondents were asked about the likelihood of a disease outbreak in their community 
using the following question: “How likely do you think it is that someone in your local 
community will be infected with measles in the next few weeks – very likely, somewhat likely, 
not too likely, or not likely at all?” Figure 2 shows the distribution of responses. Approximately 
23 percent felt that an outbreak was not at all likely, 37 percent thought an outbreak was not too 
likely, 27 percent though an outbreak was somewhat likely, and 12 percent thought an outbreak 
was very likely (See Appendix A for coding scheme). The expectation is that individuals who 
feel an outbreak is likely to happen in their neighborhood are more likely to support mandatory 
vaccination policies and will be more likely to approve of restricting school participation from 
children who are not vaccinated.     
Political Ideology: In addition to threat I posit that political ideology is a moderating variable 
that influences whether an individual will support mandatory vaccination policies or be willing 
to support restricting access to school activities from children who have not been vaccinated (See 
Appendix A for coding scheme). Though political ideology has been used to help explain how 
threat perception influences support for counterterrorism policies, we should not expect the same 
results to occur for health policy issues. Because research has found that conservatives are less 
likely to defer to science (Blank and Shaw 2015; Mooney 2005, 2012) and are less supportive of 
health policies that restrict individual liberty (Lantos et al. 2012), the expectation is that 





by their political ideology. Alternatively, the expectation is that the perception of threat will 
influence support for mandatory vaccinations policies more for liberals compared to 
conservatives.   
Figure 2: Perceived Threat of an Outbreak of Measles in Community  
 
Control Variables: I include additional control variables to account for alternative explanations 
(See Appendix for coding scheme). First, I include a variable to account for education; I expect 
that individuals who are less educated, which research has found to be concerned of vaccine 
safety, will be less likely to support mandatory vaccination policies. Secondly, because previous 
research has shown that race and income is associated with high-level concerns towards vaccine 
safety (Shui et al. 2006), I include measures for both race and income. The expectation is that 
non-whites and individuals with lower levels of income will be less likely to support mandatory 
vaccination policies. I also included control variables to account for gender and age. I expect that 





2005). Finally, I expect that as an individual gets older the more likely they will be to support 
mandatory vaccination policies (Brunson 2013).    
Results and Discussion 
 This section discusses a series of logistic regression models that estimate support for 
mandatory vaccination policies. Table 3 tests the direct effect of perception of threat and 
ideology starting with whether parents should be required to vaccinate their children and moving 
to the right to include dependent variables about whether school participation should be 
restricted from children who have not been vaccinated. Table 4 goes a step further and provides 
an interaction between the level of threat perception and ideology. The expected outcomes are 
strongly supported by the results. The descriptive statistics for the variables can be found in 
Appendix B.  
Consistent with expectation, the results suggest that perception of an outbreak of measles 
will occur in their community increases the chance that individuals will support mandatory 
vaccination policies and limit school participation for children who have not been vaccinated. 
Put another way – individuals who are most likely to feel an outbreak of measles is imminent in 
their community are more likely to support more restrictive vaccination policies. This is 
consistent with previous literature regarding the influence of threat towards support for 
counterterrorism policies in which the government limits privacy rights and restricts civil 
liberties (Huddy et al. 2005).  
Figure 3 plots the predicted probabilities for threat perception and its influence on 








Table 3: Determinants of Support for Participation in School Activities and Mandatory 
Vaccination Policies: Role of Perceived Threat 
 
  
between those who think an outbreak of measles is not likely and those who think an outbreak of 
measles is likely. This suggests those individuals who are more likely to perceive a threat of 
measles are more likely to support requiring parents to vaccinate their children.   
Moving onto limiting participation of unvaccinated children in school, Figure 4 plots the 
predicted probability for public school, private school, and daycare. Notice that for each type of 
school the curve is steep and in the positive direction. With limiting participation in public 
schools, there is a 25 percent difference between those who think an outbreak of measles is not 
likely and those who think an outbreak of measles is likely. Similarly, with participation in 





perception strongly predicts support for limiting school participation in public school, private 
school, and daycare. 





The results also show that political ideology influences whether they support parents 
being required to vaccinate their children and limiting participation for unvaccinated children in 
private school. Compared to liberals, conservatives are less likely to support limiting school 
participation for unvaccinated children in private schools and requiring parents to vaccinate their 
children. This is consistent with expectations as conservatives are more likely to reject 
mandatory government restrictions of any kind and are more in favor of individual liberty 












 Figure 5 plots the predicted probabilities of the influence of ideology on mandatory 
vaccination policies and limited participation in schools. Looking first at the influence of 
ideology on whether parents should be required to vaccinate their children there is a 7 percent 
difference between liberals and conservatives. Finally, for limiting participation for unvaccinated 
children in private schools there is an 8 percent difference between liberals and conservatives. 
Looking at the various control variables, the results show that individuals with higher 
education were less likely to support mandatory vaccination policies. This is surprising 
considering previous research on concerns about vaccine safety suggest parents with less 
education are much more likely to be concerned about vaccine safety (Gust et al. 2005; Prislin et 










Interestingly though, when individuals with higher education were asked if children who 
are not vaccinated should be restricted from school activities, they were more likely to support 
restricted participation in public schools and daycare. A possible reason for these findings may 
be that individuals with higher education are more skeptical of government involvement in 
parental decisions with respects to mandatory vaccinations but are supportive of limited school 
participation for non-vaccinated children because of public safety concerns. 
The results also suggest that African Americans are more likely to support requiring 
parents to vaccinate their children. However, when you examine whether unvaccinated children 
should be restricted from participating in public schools both African Americans and Hispanics 





research has suggested non-whites are more likely to be concerned about vaccine safety, (Shui et 
al. 2006) the lack of support for unvaccinated children participating in public school is not 
surprising. This still does not explain why African Americans are more likely to support 
requiring parents to vaccinate their children.  
Thus far, I have established that perception of threat influences supports for policies that 
require parents to vaccinate their children and limiting school participation for children who have 
not been vaccinated. In addition, the results show that ideology influences support for requiring 
parents to vaccinate their children independent of threat perception. If both perception of threat 
and ideology influence support for requiring parents to vaccinate their children, does the 
perception of threat influence liberals differently than conservatives when being asked if they 
support requiring parents to vaccinate their children?   
The results in Table 4 suggest that threat perception does influence liberals differently 
than moderates and conservatives as the interaction between the perception of threat and political 
ideology is statistically significant in the negative direction. Estimating the models for only 
liberals, moderates, and conservatives the results show that perception of threat is significant in 
the positive direction for liberals and moderates. For conservatives however, threat perception 
does not appear to influence support for requiring parents to vaccinate their children for 
conservatives. 
 Interestingly, education and gender are only significant predictors of support for requiring 
parents to vaccinate their children for conservatives. Thus, female conservatives are more likely 
to support requiring parents to vaccinate their children than liberal females. Furthermore, it 
appears that conservatives who are highly educated are less likely to support requiring parents to 





between education, gender, ideology, and support for requiring parents to vaccinate their 
children.  




 Figure 6 plots the predicted probabilities for the conditional influence of ideology for 
both liberals and conservatives. The figure suggests that liberals appear to be influenced more by 
the threat of an outbreak of measles occurring in their community compared to conservatives. 
For liberals, support for requiring parents to vaccinate their children increases as their perception 
increases. For conservatives however, they appear to not be influenced by the threat of an 
outbreak of measles occurring in their community. This suggests that support for mandatory 
vaccination policies for conservatives is influenced more by political ideology while liberals are 










 Laws that attempt to require parents vaccinate their children have been rigorously 
enforced since the 1970s. At the heart of the debate over mandatory vaccination laws is this 
sense of distrust of both vaccines and the government. Research has established that individual 
attitudes about policies can be influenced by threat but little research has examined the 
connection between threat and support for mandatory vaccination policies. As such, this paper 
explored the influence of threat and ideology on individual attitudes towards vaccination policies 
though the use of a national sample. The analysis allows for several important conclusions.  
 First, individual perception of threat does influence the support of mandatory vaccination 





However, the findings also suggest that the support of mandatory vaccination policies is also 
influenced by ideological preferences; more importantly, threat perception influences 
conservatives differently than it does liberals and moderates.  
Scholars argue that if conservatives feel a dangerous infectious disease is spreading, they 
recognize the governments need to restrict individual liberty by requiring mandatory 
vaccinations (Lantos et al. 2012; Epstein 2003). The findings here however are inconsistent with 
these assumptions. Here I find that support for mandatory vaccination policies for liberals is 
much more influenced by threat while conservatives are more influenced by ideological 
preferences. It seems that even with a highly politicized issue such as the threat of exposing the 
community to an infectious disease; conservatives are influenced more by their distrust of the 
government and science than by the perception that an outbreak in their community is imminent.  
  Second, although health scholars frequently note low-levels of education influence 
confidence in vaccines (Gust et al. 2005; Prislin et al. 1998; Shui et al. 2006), the findings here 
suggest that individuals with higher levels of education are less likely to support requiring 
parents to vaccinate their children compared to individuals with lower levels of education. 
However, the results also showed individuals with higher education are more likely to support 
limiting unvaccinated children from participating in public school. What can be made of these 
conflicting findings? One potential explanation may be that it is hard for individuals to 
rationalize requiring parents to vaccinate their children; however, it seems if parents do delay or 
forgo vaccinations individuals with higher education are more likely to support limiting 
unvaccinated children from attending public school. In other words, you do not have to vaccinate 





Finally, the findings here have broader implications for health policies regarding 
vaccinations and the ability of the government to educate the public on the need for vaccinations. 
While the effectiveness of vaccines depends on “herd immunity” being maintained, the results 
suggest that the government and pro-vaccine advocates should tailor their message to apply to 
different types of groups. For liberals, a successful message would entail advocating the threat a 
loss of “heard immunity” causes or the potential public safety risk caused by not vaccinating 
their children. Because conservatives are skeptical of government mandates and are not 
influenced by an outbreak occurring in their community, advocates for vaccines are going to 
have a difficult time tailoring a message towards conservatives about the need for vaccines. 
More research needs to examine under what circumstances conservatives will support mandatory 

















Appendix A: Variable Measurement and Data Sources 
 
 
Name Coding Scheme Source
Dependent Variable
Parents Should Be Required 
To Vaccinate 
0 = Parents should not be 
required to vaccinate; 1 = 
Parents should be required to 
vaccinate children 





Participation in Public School 0 = Unvaccinated children 
should be able to participate; 1 = 
Unvaccinated children should not 
be able to particpate 





Participation in Private School 0 = Unvaccinated children 
should be able to participate; 1 = 
Unvaccinated children should not 
be able to particpate 





Participation in Daycare 0 = Unvaccinated children 
should be able to participate; 1 = 
Unvaccinated children should not 
be able to particpate 






Threat Perception Measles outbreak in community: 
1 = Not at all likely; 2 = Not too 
likely; 3 = Somewhat likely; 4 = 
Very likley 



















Education 1 = No high school; 2 = High 
school grad; 3 = Some college; 4 
= College grad 





Age 1 = 18 to 29; 2 = 30 to 49; 3 = 50 
to 64; 4 = 65+















Income 1 = Less than $25k; 2 = $25 to 
$34k; 3 = $35 to $49k; 4 = $50 to 
$75k; 5 = Over $75k 





Ideology 1 = Liberal; 2 = Moderate; 3 = 
Conservative 



























Mean Min Max S.D. N 
Require Parents To Vaccinate Children - 0 1 0.38 1187
Limit Public School Participation - 0 1 0.49 1193
Limit Private School Participation - 0 1 0.50 1181
Limit Daycare Participation - 0 1 0.48 1190
Threat Perception 2.28 1 4 0.96 1174
Female - 0 1 0.50 1199
Education 3.01 1 4 0.95 1186
Age 2.83 1 4 1.03 1187
Black - 0 1 0.44 1199
Hispanic - 0 1 0.26 1180
Income 3.24 1 5 1.53 1075
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Anxiety and Loathing on the Trail of an Epidemic? The Link Between 
Anxiety, Confidence, and Restrictive Policy  
 
Introduction  
In March of 2014, the World Health Organization (WHO) reported that the Ebola virus 
had broken out in the Western African countries of Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Liberia (Center for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 2014). Initially, American officials and the public 
thought the outbreak was isolated to these three African countries. However, in September of 
2014, Thomas Eric Duncan, a citizen of Liberia, became infected and traveled to Texas, 
becoming the first Ebola case confirmed by the Center for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC) in the U.S. (Botelho and Wilson 2014; CDC 2014).  
No matter where they live, people around the world face potential threats of infectious 
diseases such as severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), swine flu, avian (bird) flu, and any 
number of less well-known diseases. These transferable diseases have the potential to cause 
rapidly spreading epidemics that could result in many deaths, major economic impacts, and 
media and public hysteria. Public health authorities must act quickly to reduce the spread of 
disease but the impact of their actions are often hindered by the lack of vaccines or effective 
treatments for those who become infected. 
Despite the efforts of the CDC to educate the general public in the limited ways in which 
Ebola can be transmitted, when Texas nurses Nina Pham and Amber Vinson both tested positive 
for Ebola after caring for Mr. Duncan, concern among the American public about contracting 
Ebola dramatically increased. To illustrate, a September poll conducted before both Pham and 
Vinson tested positive for Ebola showed 32 percent of Americans were worried about their 





2014a). However, a few weeks after Pham and Vinson were diagnosed, Pew conducted another 
survey and found that 41 percent of Americans were worried that they themselves or someone in 
their family would be exposed to the virus, including 17 percent who said they were very 
worried. Anxiety clearly increased after the public became aware that the Ebola crisis was not 
isolated to the three Western African countries like they initially thought.  
Public health crises, especially potential disease epidemics, raise two important 
questions. First, when public concern rises because of a potential outbreak does individual 
anxiety (personal or sociotropic) influence confidence in the government’s ability to respond to 
the crisis? Secondly, how does anxiety towards Ebola influence attitudes towards government 
policies in response to Ebola?  
In this chapter, I argue that hearing about a disease will cause individuals to become 
anxious. In order to mitigate those anxieties (personal or collective) individuals will seek out 
information from the government and identify steps the government is taking to reduce the risk 
of exposure. If individuals do not see evidence in the media that the government can reduce the 
likelihood that they will contract Ebola or that an epidemic will affect the country, their 
confidence in government will decline.  
Evaluations of Government, Anxiety, and Disease Epidemics 
Most of what we know about how individuals evaluate government comes from research 
looking at approval ratings for the president, legitimacy of the Supreme Court, and 
dissatisfaction of Congress (Caldeira 1986; Caldeira and Gibson 1992; Hibbing and Theiss-
Morse 1995). Nevertheless, effective and legitimate representative governments rely upon public 
confidence that their leaders will protect citizens and pursue the public good. When confidence 





1998). Alternatively, when confidence in government is low the government is less likely to 
comply with government recommendations during a health crisis (Taylor-Clark 2005).  
Confidence in government is particularly important during a public health crisis because 
health threats can trigger public anxiety and result in government authorities overreacting to a 
crisis like the Ebola virus (Albertson and Gadarian 2015). For example, Governor Chris Christie 
of New Jersey and Governor Andrew Cuomo of New York enacted a policy that required all 
arriving air travelers who had contact with Ebola patients in West Africa to be quarantined for 21 
days regardless if they tested negative for Ebola or showed any symptoms (Frumin 2015). 
Although these actions are well intentioned, instead of easing fears these government actions 
heightened anxiety. With concerns about Ebola rising, did individual anxiety about contracting 
Ebola influence confidence in the government’s ability to respond to Ebola? 
Anxiety can have at least two components. First, one can have anxiety because of 
concern for oneself or one’s family – often referred to as personal concern. Secondly, anxiety 
can develop out of a concern about a potential threat towards society, the country as a whole, or 
the region where one lives, etc. – often referred to as sociotropic concern. Thus, individuals can 
be anxious about someone in their family, themselves, or the United States being affected by 
Ebola. 
Recently, research has found that anxiety can have an influence on individual evaluations 
of government during a health crisis. For example, Albertson and Gadarian (2015) in their study 
of anxiety towards H1N1 and smallpox found that individuals who were more anxious about 
H1N1 and smallpox were more likely to trust the government as a source of information. Their 





trust the CDC as a source of information for smallpox. Similarly, individuals who more anxious 
about H1N1 were also more likely to trust the CDC.  
Although Albertson and Gadarian (2015) found anxiousness influences whether an 
individual views the government as a reliable source of information during times of a health 
crisis, the government does more than just provide information. During a health crisis, the 
government can provide money for research, provide vaccines and test for individual symptoms, 
quarantine people, and recommend restricting travel to areas that are more susceptible to risk. 
For example, even though the government advised against closing schools during the H1N1 
outbreak, the CDC said schools would be justified in closing “if they have a high rate of 
infection or large numbers of students with the underlying conditions that make the virus more 
dangerous” (McKenna 2009). Similarly, with smallpox the government bought enough of the 
smallpox vaccine to treat two million people just in case of a bioterrorism attack (McNeil Jr. 
2013). Thus, during a health crisis the government can play an important role in reducing anxiety 
by providing relevant information and outlining steps the government is taking to reduce the risk 
to the public; thereby improving public confidence in the government’s response to the crisis. 
Unlike the H1N1 and smallpox crisis, the information environment that existed for Ebola 
was different. After it was learned that Eric Duncan, the first U.S. death from Ebola, traveled to 
Dallas from Liberia the public began to call for an outright travel ban from the Western African 
countries infected with Ebola. A recent poll showed that 77 percent of respondents supported a 
travel ban from the United States (Laing 2014). However, despite public support for a travel ban, 
President Obama, the CDC, and Department of Homeland security added entry-screening 
restrictions at several major airports in the U.S. to detect signs of Ebola or potential exposure 





to prevent an outbreak of Ebola from occurring in the United States. Indeed, just 51 percent of 
U.S. residents felt that the American response to the current outbreak of Ebola had been adequate 
(Laing 2014). Another difference in the information environment for both H1N1 and smallpox is 
the presence of a vaccine. Despite a significant amount of federal spending to combat Ebola, a 
vaccine is still unavailable.  
During times of a crisis like Ebola, individuals feel a sense of anxiety, not only for the 
individuals who may be affected by the crisis, but also for themselves and what the crisis may 
mean for those closest to them (Atkeson and Maestas 2012). This anxiety leads individuals to 
search for information to understand the causes of the crisis in order to return to a state of normal 
processing (Atkeson and Maestas 2012; Meyer 1988; Meyer et al. 1991; Shoemaker 1996; 
Weiner 1985, 1995). If during their investigation the crisis reveals nothing of personal 
importance, or fits with their prior expectations, the public may return to their normal routines. 
On the other hand, if individuals feel a crisis is direct threat to themselves or their family, 
anxious individuals will feel the need to decipher the new information and determine 
accountability (Atkeson and Maestas 2012). Should we then expect similar patterns that were 
present for both H1N1 and smallpox to register when the public evaluates government’s ability 
to respond to Ebola?  
Because individuals who are anxious will seek out information in order to reduce their 
anxiety (Atkeson and Maestas 2012), if individuals feel the government has provided adequate 
information and has taken steps to reduce their risk to exposure their confidence in government 
should not be affected. Alternatively, if anxious individuals do not see that the steps the 





decline. Thus, anxiety (personal or collective) will reduce confidence in government unless there 
is something in the information environment that will offset or reverse individual concerns.   
H1: Anxiety (personal or and collective) will have a negative effect on confidence in 
government if individuals perceive the steps the government are taking will not reduce their 
risk of exposure to Ebola. 
 
Finally, research has also found that the type of anxiety an individual is experiencing can 
affect attitudes towards policies. For example, Davis and Silver (2004) found that individuals 
that were more concerned about another terrorist attack on the United States (sociotropic 
concern) were more likely to support policies that restricted civil liberties. Similarly, Huddy et 
al. (2005) found that individuals who were more concerned about another terrorist attack on the 
United States (sociotropic concern) were more likely to support the Bush administration’s 
antiterrorism policies. Alternatively, Joslyn and Haider-Markel (2007) found that if the threat is 
specific (in this case a threat of anthrax) personal concern plays a significant role in predicting 
policy positions only if the policy issue lends itself to an attribution of responsibility for the 
national government. In both of these cases, anthrax and terrorism, anxiety (personal or 
sociotropic) only influenced policy preferences if individuals attributed responsibility to the 
government. Because individuals tend to believe a health crisis is out of the control of the 
government (Albertson and Gadarian 2015), I expect that concern (personal or sociotropic) will 
have no impact on policy preferences towards policies dealing with Ebola.    
H2: Personal or sociotropic concern will have no effect on the policy preferences of 
individuals for policies dealing with Ebola.  
 
Data and Methods 
 The next step is to explore empirically the influence of personal and collective concern 
(anxiety) on confidence in government. Two national random sample surveys of 2,210 adults 





question. The next section outlines the dependent and independent variables taken from the 
survey that I employed in the analysis. 
Dependent Variables  
Confidence in Government: The first dependent variable measures the public’s confidence in the 
government’s ability to control an Ebola outbreak (See Appendix A for coding scheme). 
Specifically, respondents were asked: “How confident are you in the federal government’s 
ability to respond effectively to an outbreak of the Ebola virus in the United States?” Figure 1 
shows the distribution of responses; 16 percent of respondents were not confident at all in the 
government’s ability to respond to an outbreak of the Ebola virus while 19 percent of 
respondents were very confident in the government’s ability to respond to an outbreak of the 
Ebola virus. A majority of respondents (63 percent) were at least somewhat confident.  






Restrict Entry to the United States: In addition to measuring public confidence in the 
government’s ability to respond to an outbreak of the Ebola virus in the United States, I examine 
whether anxiety about the Ebola virus influences support for policies dealing with Ebola (See 
Appendix A for coding scheme). Specifically, respondents were asked, “In dealing with the 
Ebola outbreak, would you support or oppose restricting entry to the United States by people 
who’ve been in affected countries?” Figure 2 shows the distribution of responses. Approximately 
27 percent would oppose restricting entry to the United States by people who have been in 
affected countries while the remaining 73 percent support restricting entry to the United States.  
Figure 2: Support for Restricting Entry to the United States   
 
Independent Variables 
Personal and Sociotropic Concern: My primary interest is whether anxiety influences individual 
evaluations of government and policy preferences during a health crisis--in this case an outbreak 





influences evaluations of government during a health crisis, Albertson and Gadarian (2015) only 
examine whether anxiety influences if an individual views government officials as a reliable 
source of information during a health crisis. I instead examine how anxiety influences individual 
confidence in the government’s response towards Ebola and support for restrictive entry policies.   
Personal concern about an Ebola outbreak here is measured by asking respondents the 
question: “On some other issues, how do you feel about the possibility that you are someone in 
your immediate family might catch the Ebola virus – very worried, somewhat worried, not too 
worried, or not worried at all?” (See Appendix A for coding scheme). Figure 3 shows the 
distribution of responses. A majority of respondents (66 percent) were not worried about 
themselves or someone in their immediate family catching the Ebola virus. On the other hand, 
only 12 percent of respondents were very worried.  







 Concern about Ebola affecting you or your family is not the only type of anxiety that 
could influence evaluations of government during a health crisis. To measure sociotropic 
concern respondents were asked, “Apart from you and your family, how concerned are you about 
the possibility of a widespread Ebola epidemic occurring in the United States – very concerned, 
somewhat concerned, not so concerned, or not concerned at all?” (See Appendix A for coding 
scheme).1 Figure 4 shows the distribution of responses for sociotropic concern. Only 16 percent 
of respondents were not worried at all about an epidemic of Ebola occurring in the United States. 
On the other hand, 60 percent of respondents were either somewhat worried or very worried 
about an epidemic of Ebola occurring in the United States.  
Figure 4: Sociotropic Concern about an Outbreak of Ebola Affecting the United States 
 
 
                                                 
1 This sociotropic measure is similar to previous studies examining the relationship between anxiety and political 






 Clearly, both distributions are skewed but in opposite directions. Nearly 70 percent of 
respondents were not concerned about their family or themselves contracting Ebola. Indeed, only 
12 percent were very worried. On the other hand, 60 percent of respondents were worried about a 
widespread Ebola epidemic occurring in the United States. People appear less anxious about 
their own circumstances or that of their family but appear to be much more anxious about the 
threat to society as a whole.  
 In addition to my central independent variables, I also include variables for partisanship, 
political ideology, gender, education, race, and age (See Appendix A for coding scheme). 
Research has found that confidence in government is uniquely shaped by education, partisanship, 
and gender (Cook and Gronke 2005; Newton and Norris 2000). First, I expect those with higher 
levels of education will be less likely to be confidence in the government response to Ebola 
while females will be more confident in government. Secondly, because Republicans and 
Conservatives generally have negative attitudes towards the federal government (Pew Research 
Center 2015), I expect that Republicans and Conservatives will be less likely to have confidence 
in the government’s ability to respond effectively to an outbreak of Ebola.2 Finally, following 
findings examining attitudes towards counterterrorism policies (Davis and Silver 2004; Huddy et 
al. 2002, 2005) I expect Republicans and Conservative to be more supportive of policies 
restricting entry into the United States from areas impacted by Ebola. I also expect that those 
with higher education will be more likely to support policies restricting entry into the United 
States while females will be less likely to support (Huddy et al. 2005).   
                                                 
2 The Pew Research Center in 2014 found that 42 percent of Republicans have a great deal or fair amount of 
confidence in the government to prevent an Ebola outbreak, compared with 67 percent of Democrats and 51 percent 





 Finally, there is good reason to expect that people’s confidence in government and 
support for more restrictive policies towards Ebola to be affected jointly by their level of anxiety, 
partisanship/political ideology, and education (Davis and Silver 2004; Huddy et al. 2002, 2005). 
I expect that those with higher levels of education and higher anxiety will be less confident in 
government (Huddy et al. 2005). Similarly, I expect that individuals who are both anxious and 
Conservative will be less confident in government.   
Results and Discussion  
 Based on possible response categories of the dependent variables I estimated ordered 
logistic and logistic regression models to predict individual confidence in government and 
support for restrictive policies concerning Ebola. Table 1 shows the direct effect of personal and 
sociotropic concern with individual confidence towards the government’s response on Ebola, 
with Model 1 being the unconstrained model and Model 2 includes interactions (descriptive 
statistics for the variables are in Appendix B).  
The results suggest that partisanship, political ideology, and education are consistent 
indicators of confidence in the government’s ability to respond to an outbreak of Ebola 
effectively. Individuals with higher levels of education and those who identify as being either 
Republican or Conservative are less confident in the government’s ability to respond effectively 
to an outbreak of Ebola. These results are not surprising considering that pervious research 
indicates that both education and partisanship shape confidence in government (Cook and 
Gronke 2005). It may also be that those with higher education are more anxious about Ebola. As 
is shown in Table 1 (Model 2) those with higher levels of education and higher anxiety levels 





previous research. In their examination of the differences between anxiety and threat, Huddy et 
al. (2005) found that higher levels of education were a strong predictor of anxiety.  
More importantly, anxiety (both personal and sociotropic) about Ebola reduces an 
individual’s confidence in the government’s ability to respond to an Ebola outbreak, which is 
consistent with expectations. The fact that both personal and sociotropic concern appear to 
significantly decrease the likelihood of confidence suggests that the information environment 
that was present during the Ebola crisis did not reduce anxiety like it did for H1N1 and smallpox.  
Table 1: Determinants of Individual Confidence in Government Response Towards Ebola: 








Figure 5 plots the predicted probabilities of personal concern about Ebola and its 
influence on confidence in government. Note the negative direction of the slope; as personal 
concern about Ebola increases the likelihood of individual confidence in government decreases. 
Indeed, there is a 10-percentage point decline in the probability of being confident between those 
who are not worried at all and those who are very worried.  
 




Moving onto the influence of sociotropic concerns on confidence in government, Figure 
6 graphs the predicted probabilities for the relationship. Like with personal concern the slope of 
the line is negative; however, note that the negative direction is steeper for sociotropic concern 
than in personal concern. There is a 30-percentage point decline in the likelihood of confidence 
between those who are not worried at all about an epidemic of Ebola occurring in the United 










Finally, although both personal and sociotropic concern about Ebola appear to predict confidence 
in government, the figures seem to indicate that high sociotropic concern about Ebola is more 
likely to decrease confidence in government than is high personal concern.   
Figure 7 indicates that for both Conservatives and Liberals confidence in government in 
government decreases as anxiety increases. This suggests that anxiety affects Liberals more 
dramatically than it does for Conservatives. As Liberals become more anxious, their confidence 
in the government’s response to Ebola decreases. This result is not surprising considering the 
figures for both personal and sociotropic concern were in the negative direction.3 
  
 
                                                 
3 Sociotropic concern for political ideology is the only interaction that was significant. I also ran an interaction with 
personal concern but the interaction was not significant. In addition, I also ran an interaction between anxiety (both 





Figure 7: Conditional Influence of Sociotropic Concern and Political Ideology on 




Moving onto how anxiety about Ebola influences attitudes towards restrictive policies 
about Ebola, the results indicate that partisanship, political ideology, age, and education are 
consistent predictors of support for restricting entry into the United States from countries 
affected by Ebola. Individuals who are older and identify as either Republican or Conservative 
appear more likely to support restricting entry into the United States from individuals traveling 
from areas impacted by Ebola. Finally, individuals with higher levels of education are less likely 
to support restricting entry into the United States.  
The results show that sociotropic concerns about Ebola are a strong predictor of attitudes 
towards restricting entry into the United States from areas affected by Ebola. Although these 
findings are inconsistent with my expectations, the findings are consistent with the existing 





et al. 2002, 2005; Joslyn and Haider-Markel 2007). The findings appear to indicate that 
individuals may view Ebola as an issue the government is responsible for. Thus, sociotropic 
concerns about Ebola play a stronger role in how policy preferences for restricting entry into the 
United States. 
Table 2: Determinants of Individual Support for Restricting Entry into the United States: 




 Figure 8 plots the influence anxiety (sociotropic concern) about an epidemic of Ebola 
affecting the United State has on attitudes towards restricting entry into the United States from 
areas affected by Ebola. The graph shows that as individual concern about Ebola increases the 
more likely an individual will be to support restricting entry into the United States from areas 





the United States are 24 percent more likely to support restricting entry into the United States 
than those who are not worried about an Ebola epidemic affecting the United States.  




The results also show that anxiety (sociotropic) concern influences attitudes towards 
restricting entry into the United States from areas impacted by Ebola differently for Republicans 
and Democrats. Figure 9 above shows the conditional influence of partisanship and anxiety on 
policy preferences. The figure indicates that anxious Republicans are not anymore supportive of 
restricting entry into the United States from areas impacted by Ebola. Regardless of their level of 
anxiety, Republicans are supportive of restricting entry into the United States from areas with 
Ebola. However, anxious Democrats are significantly more likely to support restricting entry into 
the United States than are less anxious Democrats. This suggests that anxiety level influences the 





does for Republicans. Indeed, high anxiety makes it difficult to distinguish a Democrat from a 
Republican in terms of the likelihood of supporting an entry restriction.4     




   
Conclusion 
 Understanding how disease epidemics shape policy preferences and confidence in 
government requires not only understanding why such events engage public sentiments but also 
why they should matter to lawmakers and health policy experts. With the outbreak of Ebola 
sensationalized in the media and each party having a different view as to how the government 
should respond to the Ebola crisis, this chapter sought to answer the following questions: How 
does emotion, more specifically anxiety, about Ebola influence confidence in government? 
Secondly, how does anxiety influence attitudes towards government policies regarding Ebola? I 
                                                 
4 I investigated to see if an interaction between party ideology and sociotropic concern was present for support for 





utilized individual-level survey data collected in 2014 to examine these questions. Below I 
highlight several implications of my findings. 
 First, my findings suggest that the information environment of a particular issue 
influences the way anxiety influences confidence in government. During times of a crisis, 
anxiety will cause individuals to search for information to understand the causes of a crisis and 
its impact on themselves, their family, or the United States (Atkeson and Maestas 2012). 
However, individuals do not only care about what the government is telling the public about a 
specific disease epidemic but are also concerned about the steps the government is taking to 
reduce the risk of exposure. My findings suggest that individual anxiety (personal and 
sociotropic) about Ebola has a negative effect on confidence in government. Unlike the health 
crises of H1N1 and smallpox, where the government was clear with not only their information 
but the steps the government was taken to reduce the risk of exposure, the findings indicate that 
the information and steps the government conveyed to the public about Ebola did not reduce 
anxiety levels.  
 More importantly, my findings suggest that anxiety towards Ebola influences Liberals 
much more than it does Conservatives. The findings show that Conservatives, no matter their 
anxiety level, are less confident in the government’s response towards Ebola. With Liberals 
however, as their anxiety level increases their confidence in the government’s response to Ebola 
decrease. This is further evidence to suggest that the information environment for Ebola did not 
significantly decrease anxiety levels if anxious Liberals are less confident in the government’s 
response.  
 Second, I also analyzed individual attitudes towards restricting entry into the United 





inconsistent with expectations. Because literature has suggested individuals do not attribute 
responsibility to the government for a health crisis, I had expected individual concerns about an 
epidemic of Ebola affecting the United States would have little influence on support for policies 
dealing with Ebola. However, it appears that individuals do view Ebola as a large-scale problem. 
This is consistent with a Pew report that showed that 49 percent of respondents closely followed 
news stories about Ebola (Pew Research Center 2014). Thus, similar to previous literature on 
counterterrorism policies (Davis and Silver 2004; Huddy et al. 2002, 2005; Joslyn and Haider-
Markel 2007), sociotropic concerns about an epidemic of Ebola affecting the United States was a 
consistent predictor for support of policies involving Ebola.  
 Third, the findings indicated that anxiety conditions partisan support for restricting entry 
into the United States from areas impacted by Ebola. Research on policy preferences towards 
counterterrorism issues has found that Republicans are more likely to support more restrictive 
policies (Davis and Silver 2004; Huddy et al. 2002, 2005), and my findings suggest that 
Republicans are more supportive of harsher penalties during a health crisis. However, my results 
also suggest that anxiety conditions the influence of partisanship in that Democrats who are more 
anxious are more likely to support restricting entry into the United States, making them much 
more like all Republicans (anxious or not) on this issue. Future research should examine if 
anxiety conditions the influence of partisanship on other health issues as well.  
 Finally, the findings have broader implications for our understanding of public opinion 
and public health and the ability of the government to effectively message during a health crisis. 
The results show here that individuals do not treat all health crises equally and that the 
information environment can significantly influence confidence in government and policy 





campaigns about public health crises, the public not only has to look at the government for 
expertise but also believe that the steps taken by the government are reducing their risk of 
exposure (Gronke 2015). If the public does not trust government officials to provide needed 




























Appendix A: Variable Measurement and Data Sources 
 
Name Coding Scheme Source
Dependent Variable
Confidence in Government 1 = Not Confident at all; 2 = No 
So Confident; 3 = Somewhat 
Confident; 4 = Very Confident
2014 ABC/Washington 
Post Poll: Congress / 
Political Parties / Ebola/ 
2016 Presidential
Support for Restricting Entry 
into the United States
0 = Oppose; 1 = Support 2014 ABC/Washington 
Post Poll: Congress / 
Political Parties / Ebola/ 
2016 Presidential
Independent Variables 
Personal Concern Worry about Yourself or Family 
catching Ebola: 1 = Not Worried 
at all; 2 = Not too worried; 3 = 
Somewhat worried; 4 = Very 
Worried
2014 ABC/Washington 
Post Poll: Congress / 
Political Parties / Ebola/ 
2016 Presidential
Sociotropic Concern Worry about an epidemic of 
Ebola occuring in the United 
States: 1 = Not Worried at all;      
2 = Not too worried;                        
3 = Somewhat worried;              
4 = Very Worried
2014 ABC/Washington 
Post Poll: Congress / 
Political Parties / Ebola/ 
2016 Presidential
Party ID (Republican) 1 = Democract;                          
2 = Independent; 3 = Republican
2014 ABC/Washington 
Post Poll: Congress / 
Political Parties / Ebola/ 
2016 Presidential
Ideology (Conservative) 1 = Liberal; 2 = Moderate;          
3 = Conservative 
2014 ABC/Washington 
Post Poll: Congress / 









Female 0 = Male; 1 = Female 2014 ABC/Washington 
Post Poll: Congress / 
Political Parties / Ebola/ 
2016 Presidential
Age 1 = 18 to 29; 2 = 30 to 39; 3 = 40 
to 49; 4 = 50 to 64; 5 = 65+
2014 ABC/Washington 
Post Poll: Congress / 
Political Parties / Ebola/ 
2016 Presidential
Education 1 = High school or less; 2 =  
Some college; 3 = College 
degree; 4 = Post-graduate 
degree
2014 ABC/Washington 
Post Poll: Congress / 
Political Parties / Ebola/ 
2016 Presidential
White 0 = Non-White; 1 = White 2014 ABC/Washington 
Post Poll: Congress / 























Mean Min Max S.D. N 
Confidence in Government 2.65 1 4 0.96 2180
Support Restrict Entry to United States - 0 1 0.44 2098
Personal Concern 2.12 1 4 1.02 2195
Sociotropic Concern 2.66 1 4 1.02 2204
Party ID 1.99 1 3 0.95 2126
Ideology 2.15 1 3 0.76 2129
Female - 0 1 0.50 2210
Age 3.6 1 5 1.39 2186
Education 2.17 1 4 1.07 2186
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Public Opinion, Emotion, and Policy: Where Do We Go Next? 
 When a crisis hits the United States it often times is associated with any number of 
adjectives (i.e. anxiety, worry, concern). Terrorist attacks, natural disasters, and disease 
epidemics all have the potential to trigger emotions (positive or negative) which influence 
evaluations of government and policy preferences. The purpose of this dissertation is to 
understand the interplay between public opinion about health issues and health policy.  
Although existing research has examined public attitudes towards various health policy 
issues (see Frewer 2003; Gollust and Lynch 2011; Jacobs and Mettler 2011; Joffe 2011), little 
research has examined how public opinion about health issues impacts policy, policy 
preferences, and evaluations of government on health issues. In an attempt to answer these 
questions, I examined three public health in which public opinion or emotion could impact 
attitudes: the ACA, vaccines, and Ebola. Below I summarize and discuss my findings and its 
implications for researchers, policymakers, and public health officials. 
Public Opinion and the ACA 
 Even though most research on the influence of public opinion on health care reform has 
taken place at the national level (Blendon et al. 1995; Jacobs 2008), the ACA provides a unique 
opportunity to examine how public opinion influences policymakers at the state level. When the 
ACA was passed in 2010, resistance from the states was immediate. Before the ink had dried 
from President Obama signing the ACA into law, twelve states had already joined with the State 
of Virginia in suing the federal government over the passage of the ACA (Joondeph 2011). To 
entice states to expand Medicaid and create a health exchange the federal government agreed to 
subsidize 100 percent of the costs until 2022, when the government would then only cover 90 
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percent the costs (Young 2012). To date 32 states (including DC) have expanded Medicaid while 
19 states have yet to expand (Kaiser Family Foundation 2016a).  
My findings in Chapter 2 show that policy-specific opinion does influence state adoption 
of provisions of the ACA; even after controlling for voter ideology, legislative ideology, and the 
governor. These findings contradict previous research suggesting public opinion has little 
influence on state adoption of the ACA (Barrilleaux and Rainey 2014). This suggests that state 
policymakers are responsive to public opinion in policy matters involving the ACA. 
 Despite these findings many would still argue that policy-specific opinion has little 
influence on ACA-related policy adoption. Instead many would contend that citizen ideology is 
the primary driver because it is unreasonable to expect detailed policy preferences from voters 
and unrealistic to assume elected representatives are mindful of voters’ policy preferences 
(Erikson et al. 1993; Stimson et al. 2002). Nonetheless, the path analysis conducted suggests that 
citizen ideology is directly associated with policy-specific opinion towards the ACA. Even if 
policymakers are unaware of public opinion towards the ACA, the fact that there is a relationship 
between citizen ideology and policy-specific opinion suggests that policymakers can use citizen 
ideology to (in addition to policy-specific opinion) to pass policies that are responsive to citizen 
wishes.   
Although the findings suggest responsiveness is occurring, many questions are still left 
unanswered. During the years of my analysis (2010 to 2015), average public opinion support for 
the ACA never reached a majority, indeed a recent Kaiser Family Foundation poll in 2016 found 
that 49 percent of the public had an unfavorable opinion towards the ACA (Kaiser Family 
Foundation 2016c). Thus, the most obvious question unanswered is at what level does opinion 
matter? Does it need to be a simple majority or, as some suggest, does it need to be a 
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supermajority (Lax and Phillips 2012)? Lax and Phillips (2012) contend that in many policy 
areas a simple majority is not enough and indeed a supermajority is necessary for the policy to 
pass. Future research needs to examine what opinion majority is needed for provisions of the 
ACA to be adopted in a given state.  
For policy scholars the findings demonstrate the value of estimating policy-specific 
opinion at the state level. For policymakers it suggests that government efforts need to continue 
to press the benefits of the ACA to the states. Many of the states that have yet to expand 
Medicaid (i.e. Texas and Georgia) stand to benefit the most as their uninsured rates are among 
the highest in the country (Kaiser Family Foundation 2016b). Also the government needs to 
continue to educate the public of the benefits of the ACA. Even though the ACA has expanded 
health care coverage to over 16 million individuals, prevented insurance companies from 
denying coverage to individuals with preexisting conditions, and has allowed children to stay on 
their parent’s insurance until the age of 26, public opinion towards the ACA is very much 
divided.   
Vaccines and Threat Perception 
 In Chapter 3, I was seeking to understand how the perception of an outbreak of measles 
occurring in a community influenced support for mandatory vaccination policies. The success of 
vaccination programs relies upon “herd immunity,” which occurs when a significant portion of a 
community is immunized against a contagious disease. However, achieving herd immunity faces 
many barriers. First, a greater portion of the public are concerned about the side effects of 
vaccines (Gowda and Dempsey 2013). Second, vaccines are a victim of their own success since 
most of the diseases vaccines are meant to protect (i.e. smallpox, measles, etc.) are unfamiliar to 
many. Nevertheless, outbreaks in the United States still occur and in 2014 a measles outbreak 
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tied to the Disneyland resorts in California, renewed the debate over mandatory vaccinations in 
the United States. 
 Although outbreaks of disease that have vaccinations connected to them do not occur 
often, the outbreak at the Disneyland resorts heightened awareness about the potential of an 
outbreak occurring in communities and schools. In order for states to maintain herd immunity 
many mandate vaccines for any child wishing to attend a public school or daycare. However, 
despite the scientific evidence finding the side effects of vaccines are minimal, support for the 
government mandating vaccines is mixed. Chapter 3 examined the relationship between the 
threat of an outbreak of measles occurring in a community and support for mandatory 
vaccination policies.  
 The findings show that individual perception of threat does influence support for 
requiring parents to vaccinate their children; as perception that a measles outbreak would occur 
in the community increased, support for requiring parents to vaccinate increased as well. The 
results also indicate that individuals who perceive an outbreak of measles will occur in their 
community are more likely to support restricting school participation for unvaccinated children. 
Moreover, the perception of threat influences conservatives differently than it does liberals and 
moderates. I find as the perception of threat increases for Liberals their support for requiring 
parents to vaccinate their children significantly increases while Conservatives are more 
influenced by ideological preferences. Considering that research has found that conservatives 
tend to recognize the need to restrict liberty during a health crisis (Lantos et al. 2012; Epstein 
2003) these results were surprising. What leads conservatives to be less likely to support 
mandatory vaccination policies?  
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 Even though a recent Pew Report found in 2015 that conservatives view a major role for 
the government in ensuring food and medicine are safe for consumption, conservatives are in 
general more distrustful of the government and exhibit more anger towards the government (Pew 
Research Center 2015). This has implications for pro-vaccine advocates who depend on the 
“herd immunity” that vaccinations provide. If conservatives are not fearful of an outbreak but are 
also not supportive of mandatory vaccination policies how can vaccine advocates educate 
conservatives the benefits to public safety? Future research needs to examine if the lack of 
support for conservatives is more than just a distrust of the government and is more indicative of 
a distrust of science towards vaccines (Blank and Shaw 2015; Mooney 2005, 2012). 
Finally, the findings here have broader implications for health policies regarding 
vaccinations and the ability of the government to educate the public on the need for vaccinations. 
While the effectiveness of vaccines depends on “herd immunity” being maintained, the results 
suggest that the government and pro-vaccine advocates should tailor their message to apply to 
different types of groups. For liberals, a successful message would entail advocating the potential 
public safety risk caused by not vaccinating their children. Because conservatives are skeptical of 
government mandates and are not influenced by the threat of an outbreak occurring in their 
community, advocates for vaccines may have to tailor their message to involve a discussion 
about the increased health costs associated with unvaccinated children or a measles outbreak 
(Haelle 2015).   
Anxiety, Confidence in Government, and Policy Preferences 
Finally, in Chapter 4 I sought to understand who disease epidemics shape policy 
preferences and confidence in government. Understanding how disease epidemics shape policy 
preferences and confidence in government requires not only understanding why such events 
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engage public sentiments but also why they should matter to lawmakers and health policy 
experts. I utilized individual-level survey data collected in 2014 to examine these questions and 
make several contributions to the literature.  
First, my findings suggested that the information environment of Ebola does not follow 
the similar patterns identified in both H1N1 and smallpox (Albertson and Gadarian 2015). When 
individuals are anxious they seek out information in order to determine if this is a crisis is of 
personal concern (Atkeson and Maestas 2012). For both H1N1 and smallpox anxiety caused 
individuals to view the government as a trusted source for information on both H1N1 and 
smallpox (Albertson and Gadarian 2015). My findings indicate that anxiety (personal and 
sociotropic) decreased individual confidence towards a government response for Ebola. This 
suggests that individuals not only care about what the government is telling the public about a 
specific disease epidemic but are also worried about the steps the government is taking and want 
those steps clearly communicated to the public.  
 More importantly, my findings suggest that anxiety towards Ebola influences Liberals 
much more than it does Conservatives. The findings show that Conservatives, no matter their 
anxiety level, are less confident in the government’s response towards Ebola. With Liberals 
however, as their anxiety level increased their confidence in the government’s response to Ebola 
decreases.  
 Secondly, my findings showed that individual attitudes towards restricting entry into the 
United States from areas impacted by Ebola is influenced only sociotropic concerns and not 
personal concerns. This is consistent literature examining policy preferences towards 
counterterrorism policies (Davis and Silver 2004; Huddy et al. 2002, 2005; Joslyn and Haider-
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Markel 2007). These findings also indicate that individuals view the Ebola outbreak as a large-
scale problem the government must solve.    
 Perhaps more interesting though, are how anxiety conditions partisan support for 
restricting entry into the United States. Research on policy preferences towards counterterrorism 
issues has found that Republicans are more likely to support more restrictive policies (Davis and 
Silver 2004; Huddy et al. 2002, 2005), and my findings suggest that Republicans are more 
supportive of harsher penalties during a health crisis. However, my results also suggest that 
anxiety conditions the influence of partisanship in that Democrats who are more anxious are 
more likely to support restricting entry into the United States, making them much more like all 
Republicans (anxious or not) on this issue.    
 Finally, the findings have broader implications for our understanding of public opinion 
and public health and the ability of the government to effectively message during a health crisis. 
The results show here that individuals do not treat all health crises equally and that the 
information environment can significantly influence confidence in government and policy 
preferences. Because the government depends on the public being receptive to education 
campaigns about public health crises, the public not only has to look at the government for 
expertise but also believe that the steps taken by the government are reducing their risk of 
exposure (Gronke 2015). If the public does not trust government officials to provide needed 
information or take appropriate action, individuals are less likely to comply with government 
recommendations.  
Where Do We Go Next? 
 The ultimate point of this dissertation was to examine the interplay between public 
opinion and health policy issues. Through an examination of the ACA, vaccines, and infectious 
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diseases I showed that in fact emotion and public opinion play a role in policymaking, influence 
our evaluations of government, and finally support for more restrictive policies. While this work 
only focused on a few areas of health policy there are many other areas in health policy in which 
future research should examine the relationship between emotion, public opinion and its 
influence on public policy.  
 The World Health Organization (WHO) announced that the Zika virus was a public 
health emergency of international concern (Pearson 2016). However, many of the concerns that 
are associated with Ebola are not present with Zika. For example, the Zika virus is not 
transmitted through passive contact like Ebola. Furthermore, individuals do not usually get sick 
enough to require hospitalization and Zika is rarely fatal (Villanueva and Cook 2016). 
Nevertheless, WHO and the CDC have recommended women traveling to countries with known 
cases to avoid getting pregnant while Major League Baseball (MLB) cancelled an upcoming 
matchup between the Pittsburg Pirates and the Miami Marlins that was to take place in Puerto 
Rico (ESPN 2016).  
Should we expect similar anxiousness with Zika that is shown with Ebola? With over 63 
percent of the public viewing the spread of infectious diseases throughout the world (Gallup 
2016) as a critical threat to the United States emotions about various diseases will continue to be 
an important area of research. After the slow response towards Ebola, the political pressure on 
WHO and the CDC to take action is strong.  
Zika is just one area of health policy in which public opinion and emotion could 
influence policymakers. Another area is the current opioid and prescription drug epidemic 
currently affecting the United States. Drug overdose is the leading cause of accidental death in 
the United States with 47,055 lethal drug overdoses and 18,893 overdose deaths in 2014 alone 
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(American Society of Addiction Medicine 2016). A recent Kaiser Family Foundation poll found 
that the 35 percent of the public views heroin abuse among one of the most serious health 
problems facing the United States – second only to cancer (Kaiser Family Foundation 2016d). 
Despite heroin and prescription drug abuse being a serious threat to the public health of 
the United States, discrimination exists for both demographics. For example, 52 percent of public 
view people who are addicted to heroin as facing a lot of discrimination while only 38 percent of 
the public view people who are addicted to prescription painkillers as facing a lot of 
discrimination (Kaiser Family Foundation 2016d). With the Obama Administration lifting 
restrictions on doctors, providing new funding to Community Health Centers across the United 
States, and funding state programs seeking to curb addiction (White House 2016), what impact 
do public perceptions toward opioid use have on the policy preferences of individuals? Will 
public attitudes on these issues influence the decisions of policymakers? My research has offered 
some perspective on how these questions might be answered, and also clarify the measurement 
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